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Masters of Science in Real Estate Development
ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of three development options for an urban
health center -- a real project which is receiving serious consideration
at the time of this writing. The prospective developer is Harvard
Community Health Plan (HCHP), the oldest and fastest growing Health
Maintenance Organization (HMO) in Massachusetts. The site, one of the few
remaining developable parcels in downtown Boston, is located within the
so-called Custom House Historic District. Of the three development
options, one contains only clinical space; the other two contain
significant amounts of market-rate office and retail space in addition to
clinical space.
Although in the 15 years since its founding, HCHP has successfully
developed nearly 500,000 square feet of clinical and office space for its
own use, the organization has never before developed any kind of space for
lease or sale to others.
The central question addressed by this analysis is, "Should an HMO, or any
other non-profit organization, be involved in real estate development?"
The answer is, "Yes, under certain circumstances, but with a complete
understanding of the risks involved, and assurance that under worst-case
assumptions, the real estate deal offers comparable returns to the broad
range of other possible investments."
The thesis evaluates financial, marketing, construction, approvals,
management, public image, and physical suitability risks in light of
HCHP's history as an organization, and particularly the organization's
current financial situation. It also discusses alternative deal
structures which could make any development option more attractive. The
thesis concludes with specific accommodations as to how HCHP should
proceed, strongly recommending one of the options over the others.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 1985, Harvard Community Health Plan signed a 99-year ground lease
for one of few remaining developable parcels in downtown Boston. The
parcel has an area of 10,800 square feet and is located within the Custom
House Historic District. There are two existing structures on the site:
a 7-story commercial office building containing 30,000 square feet, and a
4-story Federal-style warehouse containing 5,000 square feet. The latter
is one of only eight buildings which survive from more than sixty executed
according to a visionary master plan by Massachusetts architect Charles
Bulfinch in 1805-1807. As such, it is an historic landmark which must be
preserved. Despite these two existing buildings, less than half the site
is occupied. The unbuilt portion is covered by an L-shaped surface
parking lot.
The ground lease was obtained at considerable effort. Negotiations with
the dentist who owns the land were prolonged, dragging on for more than a
year after HCHP made its initial offer. The final lease terms are
distinctive in at least one respect. The owner of the land has a "put
option" throughout the lease term. At the end of any year he can require
HCHP to purchase the property at a price equal to 10 times the previous
year's ground rent, but not less than $4,900,000.
HCHP is presently studying three development options for the site.
Steffian Bradley Associates and the George Macomber Company, the same
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architect/contractor team which has built all of HCHP's previous
facilities, have produced preliminary schematic designs and cost estimates
for each of these three options:
Option A:
Site Area: 10,800 sf
Building Area: 65,000 sf
Floor Area Ratio: 6.0
Estimated Cost: $7.8 million
Option A calls for retaining both the existing 4-story warehouse and the
existing 7-story commercial building, and infilling the unbuilt portion of
the site with enough building volume to provide a gross building area of
65,000 square feet. A new HCHP Health Center would occupy Option A in its
entirety.
Option B:
Site Area: 10,800 sf
Building Area: 135,000 sf
Floor Area Ratio: 12.5
Estimated Cost: $13.6 million
Option B calls for retaining the existing 4-story warehouse, demolishing
the existing 7-story commercial building, and on 9,600 square feet of the
site then unoccupied, building a structure of size and configuration
acceptable to the Boston Redevelopment Authority. The BRA has tentatively
accepted a 14-story structure which retains ties to the historic Bulfinch
warehouse. This would produce a gross building area of 135,000 square
feet. Roughly half this area would be occupied by new HCHP Health
Center. The other half would be available for market-rate commercial
office and retail use.
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Option C:
Site Area: 21,000 sf
Building Area: 280,000 sf
Floor Area Ratio: 13.3
Estimated Cost: $24.8 million
Option C calls for retaining the existing 4-story warehouse, demolishing
the existing 7-story commercial building, and then negotiating with the
owner of an adjacent parcel for the right to build a project which is
double the size of Option B. For this purpose, the BRA has tentatively
supported the idea of permanently closing the one-block street which
presently separates the two parcels. On the resulting 21,000 square foot
combined site, the BRA has tentatively accepted a 14-story structure which
steps down to 7- or 8-stories toward the historic Grain Exchange Building,
while retaining ties to the historic Bulfinch warehouse. This would
produce a gross building area of 280,000 square feet. Approximately
65,000 square feet would be occupied by a new HCHP Health Center. The
remaining 215,000 square feet would be available for market-rate
commercial office or retail use.
HCHP's present downtown Health Center is one block from the potential
development site, in space for which HCHP signed a 10-year lease in
mid-1984. The lease is at the rate of $14.75 per square foot, and it
includes HCHP's right to terminate at the end of any year after 5 years
providing it pays the landlord a modest termination penalty. If the
economics support it, HCHP would like to move into its own building as
early as mid-1989, the earliest of the five possible termination dates
under its present lease.
-3-
What motivates HCHP to own rather than lease its facilities is a strong
sense of fiduciary responsibility to its members. HCHP's mission is to
provide affordable pre-paid health care and insurance. The success of
this mission is critically dependent on the organization's ability to
control costs. Like many other businesses, HCHP has long believed that
owning the buildings which house its operations is one key means to this
end. As a consequence, HCHP owns all but one of its present facilities.
These include a 100-bed hospital, a clinical laboratory, administrative
offices, and six of its seven health centers. Only its new downtown
Boston Health Center is leased.
Even so, by the admission of its administrators, HCHP has not been able to
control costs. The organization is threatened by the same wildly rising
costs of personnel, insurance and medical supplies which confound the
entire health care industry. One senior administrator contends that
HCHP's past success has been entirely due to two conditions: membership
has often grown faster than predicted; and investment of reserve funds
has occassionally yielded greater-than-expected returns. These conditions
are unlikely to persist. Membership growth has peaked and is predicted to
decline over the next five years, and double-digit inflation has subsided,
lowering investment returns of all kinds. HCHP can not look to the
windfalls which have kept it solvent in the past. Nor can it prudently
allow its utilization reserve to continue to be so low as these funds are
nearly fully depleted each year.
HCHP needs to raise its revenues while controlling costs as best it can.
The organization has two choices: raise membership fees to cover
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increased fiscal burdens, or find alternative sources of revenue. The
former is all but impossible given the extremely competitive market. The
latter is a question of strategy. HCHP could expand geographically,
setting up health centers and service plans in less competitive markets.
Or HCHP could expand its services, getting into businesses such as life
care or medical supplies which have high profit-making potential. Or
finally, HCHP could become more involved in real estate, owning buildings
not only to control costs and enforce facility management standards, but
also to generate cash.
HCHP is seriously considering the latter strategy at a time when the
Boston real estate market is increasingly confounded by many factors: a
restrictive regulatory process; powerful public opposition against
anything which threatens the environmental or historical status quo; and a
steadily softening office market. By its nature as an insurer, HCHP has
considerable aversion to risk. Yet by its nature as a business with
strong competitors, HCHP must take those risks it thinks it can manage,
especially to secure rewards which will stabilize its future ability to
deliver health care services of the highest quality.
Clearly, Option C would be an ambitious project even for a real estate
development company. It would require an increase in the as-of-right FAR
from 10 to nearly 14, acceptable environmental impact within a sensitive
historic district, a successful leasing strategy for surplus space of
210,000 square feet, and collaboration with an out-of-town partner -- the
Chicago-based developer who owns the adjacent parcel. Option B is nearly
as ambitious. It would also require an increase in the as-of-right FAR
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from 10 to 12.5, and acceptable environmental impact within a sensitive
historic district. However, Option B would entail the burden of leasing
only one-third as much space or 75,000 square feet, and could be
undertaken without the cooperation of the adjacent parcel owner. Option A
poses the most serious technical design and construction problems. Option
A calls for infilling between two historic buildings of different
centuries, and therefore requires the successful resolution of different
architectural styles, floor elevations, structural systems, and
propensities for foundation settlement. When completed, Option A would
afford neither parking, nor room for HCHP's expansion, nor space for
market-rate rental.
Just as the options pose different problems and risks, so do they come
with different price tags. Option C has the greatest equity requirement
but the lowest per square foot cost. Option A has a modest equity
requirement but the highest per square foot cost by 36%. As schematically
designed, the three options also vary in their suitability for HCHP's
standard health center operations and attractiveness for office rental.
Evaluation on these issues depends on floor size, configuration of
elevators, orientation of lobbies, number of parking spaces for staff and
visitors, and flexibility for expansion.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to lay out the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of each option, and to suggest what tradeoffs
are appropriate given HCHP's financial and operational goals. The
central question is whether a private health-care organization ought to be
involved in real estate development. This turns out to be a much more
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important question than which option offers higher returns, for the answer
defines what are acceptable risks. The thesis begins with background on
HCHP, focusing on what has led the organization to become involved in real
estate so far and what is driving it to consider becoming involved even
further. The thesis then presents a detailed analysis of the three
development options, followed by a discussion of various deal structures
HCHP might consider in order to realize the greatest benefits, financial
and otherwise. The thesis concludes with specific recommendations for
what HCHP should do to make a timely and informed decision about this
development prospect.
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Chapter 1
COPING WITH GROWTH
Nineteen-eighty-four was a banner year for Boston real estate. It was
also a banner year for Harvard Community Health Plan, the oldest and
fastest growing Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) in Massachusetts.
In just this one year HCHP opened four new health centers, a feat of
considerable complexity and boldness. Together these new centers nearly
doubled the organization's clinical capacity, jumping it from a total of
244,000 square feet to a total of 455,000 square feet. At the beginning
of 1984, HCHP had the capacity for 170,000 members. By the end of the
year, it had increased its capacity to 250,000 members.\1 Total HMO
membership in the Greater Boston area reached 445,000. HCHP's membership
reached 180,000, representing a market share of slightly over 40%.\2
HCHP grew out of a three-year grant which was awarded to the Harvard
Medical School in 1967. Charged with developing a pre-paid plan for
comprehensive medical care, the School established HCHP in 1969. Over the
next 15 years the organization's membership grew steadily. Eventually the
first Kenmore Health Center (1969) was joined by additional centers:
Cambridge (1973/1975); a second expanded Kenmore Center (1979); Wellesley
(1980); Medford (1981); and Braintree (1982).\3
As early as 1974, Kenmore Center membership exceeded the facility's
physical capacity and controls were introduced to limit enrollment. In
1979 the Center was relocated to an old S.S. Pierce warehouse and expanded
to 100,000 square feet. Still the over-subscription problem persisted.
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To compound the difficulty of coping with a membership glut, through the
1970's the HMO industry standard for space per member increased 50%, from
1.0 square foot per member to 1.5 square feet per member. In 1983, HCHP
was actually forced to turn away new members at the Kenmore Center.
Alleviating this pressure was the primary reason for HCHP's decision to
open its first downtown center.\ 4 This it did in 1984. In this same
year, HCHP also opened its first center in Peabody, and second centers in
Medford and Braintree, all within five months of each other.
Conventional debt financing for HCHP's real estate projects has
traditionally been arranged with the Prudential Insurance Company. Equity
for the four health centers opened in 1984 was raised by revenue bonds for
$49 million. These bonds were issued in December 1983 by the
Massachusetts Health and Educational Facilities Authority (HEFA). As a
condition of the issue, HCHP granted HEFA a lien on its gross receipts as
security for its obligation to repay the 6% to 10-1/4% tax-exempt
bonds.\5 Beginning in 1985 and ending in 2015, HCHP will pay HEFA
$5,245,000 annual debt service for principal and interest on this issue.
To secure this flow of payments, HCHP has placed $15.3 million in escrow
with HEFA's Bond Trustee. This account comprises a construction and debt
service fund, and a debt service reserve fund.\6
As of September 1984, HCHP had an unsecured line of credit for $5 million
at the prime rate. At a another bank, HCHP had a second line of credit
for $1 million. No amounts were borrowed under these lines of credit
during fiscal 1983 or 1984.\7
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HCHP is a 501-C3, tax-exempt organization. Interestingly, although its
real estate holdings entitle HCHP to depreciation and interest deductions
which it cannot use, HCHP has never attempted to share or sell these tax
benefits by involving investors or partners in its real estate deals. By
1984, HCHP's land, buildings, equipment and furniture had a total value of
$72 million and had accumulated depreciation of $12.3 million. In 1984
alone, accumulated depreciation was $2.6 million and interest expense was
$3.2 million.\8 These total potential deductions of $5.8 million would
have been worth $2.9 million to a 50% taxpayer in need of shelter.
HCHP's core mission is to provide pre-paid, high-quality managed health
care at a reasonable cost. In the jargon of the HMO industry, HCHP is a
staff model (physicians are on staff rather than engaged as consultants),
closed panel (services are offered to subscribers only), pre-paid (not
pay-as-you-require-care), group practice. The HMO industry is young and
dynamic. Other organizations have evolved with fundamentally different
structures: insurance companies with groups of physicians under contract
to provide care to their subscribers; preferred provider organizations
(PPO's) which serve subscribers but also non-subscribers; and independent
practice associations (IPA's) which provide subscribers with access to a
network of care providers and facilities.\9
HCHP is distinctive in at least one other respect -- its roots are in the
Harvard Medical School. Although not corporately connected to Harvard,
HCHP has strong ties to the institution which spawned its genesis. Its
Board is drawn in large part from the Harvard Medical School faculty. A
preponderance of its medical staff are Harvard-trained physicians,
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recruited from among Harvard's teaching hospitals. HCHP's hospital
affiliations reinforce the Harvard connection. HCHP members receive
secondary care at both Brigham and Women's Hospital and Massachusetts
General Hospital Children's Service, two of the finest hospitals in the
United States and both Harvard teaching hospitals. HCHP's teaching
emphasis also reinforces the Harvard connection. Since 1976, HCHP's
Teaching Center has served many Harvard Medical School students in their
second-year "Introduction to Clinical Medicine" and other electives. And
in 1985, HCHP's former Director of Medical Services will introduce an
alternative curriculum for about 15 percent of the entering medical school
class at Harvard.\10
The business goals of HCHP are in a state of constant flux. The board,
administrators and physicians all share the sense that HCHP needs to
diversify in order to sustain its financial success which up until now has
been rather a matter of luck. Membership growth exceeded predictions, and
investment returns ran high in the years of double-digit inflation.
Meanwhile, the HMO field has become increasingly competitive. Symptomatic
of the health care industry in general, for-profit businesses are
squeezing out non-profit businesses. Non-profits are converting to
for-profit.\11 HCHP cannot risk losing members by raising membership
fees. Its only other choice is to find alternative sources of revenue.
There are two areas of possible diversification which are frequently
discussed by the HCHP Board. One is real estate speculation in
anticipation of new health-related ventures. The other is the medical
supply business.\12 Already HCHP has started to diversify geographically
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and structurally. In late 1984, HCHP formed the "Managed Care
Corporation," a for-profit company dedicated to undertaking innovative
health care ventures. MCC is an independent company, financed primarily
by venture capital. HCHP is its largest single shareholder and designates
four representatives on MCC's seven-member Board of Directors. In its
first year of existence, MCC formed joint venture health plans with
existing health care organizations in Massachusetts -- Worcester and Fall
River, California, and North Carolina.\13 While it might be inappropriate
for MCC to get involved in HCHP's deal for the new downtown Health Center,
HCHP has set a precedent for the sort of for-profit affiliate it might
create specifically for real estate ventures.
In its 16-year existence, HCHP has been extremely successful. Since 1979
its revenues have exceeded its expenses. Revenues in 1984 totaled
$139 million, while expenses totaled $131 million. Typical of recent
performance, this reflects a 6% "profit." HCHP administrators admit that
the organization's solvency has unfortunately not been due to its ability
to manage costs, but rather to two other factors. Membership has
consistantly grown faster than expected. And investment of HCHP's
reserves have yielded greater than expected returns due to high interest
rates.\14
Federal regulations allow non-profit organizations to distribute their net
revenues after expenses (ie. their profit) in several forms: staff
bonuses, teaching programs, foundations which endow their operations, and
reserve accounts of all kinds. HCHP's net revenues fund all of these
things, including both a capital reserve and a "utilization" reserve. The
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latter protects HCHP against excessive hospitalization costs which may be
incurred by its members. If members suffer prolonged disabilities or
undergo major operations like heart transplants, the utilization reserve
may be completely depleted. To cover this exigency, HCHP carries medical
insurance to cover the shortfall. In the early 1980's, this insurance was
drawn upon to cover a $5 million overrun of its utilization reserve.
HCHP's policy was subsequently cancelled, and the organization was forced
to obtain insurance from another company at a much higher rate.
Investment of the reserve monies is managed by HCHP's Vice President for
Financial Operations.\15 The 1984, HCHP appropriated a capital reserve of
$4 million, and a utilization reserve of $3 million.\16
Member premiums account for over 90% of HCHP's revenues. In recent years,
membership across HCHP centers has grown at a rate of 16% compounded
annually. In the future, it is predicted to slow to a rate of 12%.\17
This prediction of membership growth slowing is ominous for HCHP's
utilization reserve. With the possibility that new members may number
fewer than expected, for the first time in HCHP's history
over-subscription may not contribute a vital supply of funds to the
utilization reserve. At the same time, interest rates which are the other
traditional supplier of utilization reserve funds are steadily declining.
It is clear that new sources of revenues in excess of expenses need to be
found. If HCHP cannot raise membership fees and cannot better control its
costs, there are a limited number of basic strategies left: it can
diversify into less competitive geographic areas; it can diversify into
new businesses such as life-care and medical supplies which promise great
profits, or it can attempt to capture extra cash through its holdings in
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medical real estate. Through its affiliate, MCC, HCHP is already trying
geographic and service diversification. Through the project under study
here, it may be about to try real estate development.
Decisions about all aspects of the new downtown Center have to be
considered in light of the existing one. HCHP's existing Boston Center
was opened to accomplish four goals: alleviate membership pressure at the
Kenmore Center which was then closed to new members; capture an additional
share of the HMO market; beat competitors to the downtown location; and
provide a more convenient means for members to make office-based rather
than home-based visits. Among the 150,000 members which HCHP had in 1983,
about 22,000 or 15% were found to work downtown. It was predicted that in
its first year, a new Boston Center would attract 10,000 transfers and
5,000 new memberships. Planning for an initial capacity of 15,000, and a
maximum capacity of 30,000, HCHP undertook the planning of its present
downtown center.\18
HCHP investigated options to either purchase or lease downtown property.
The most expeditious option was to lease a 50,000 square-foot, 10-story
building which the landlord was able to deliver entirely vacant. The
necessary renovations were extensive, and included constructing a new
elevator/stair tower in an enclosed courtyard. Hard costs came to
$6 million, or $120 per square foot. HCHP shared this cost with its
landlord: HCHP contributed $3.4 million and the building owner
contributed $2.6 million.\19
Within a year of its opening, the new Boston Center validated HCHP's
-14-
decision to move downtown. There has proven to be a strong market for
office-based visits. After a sluggish start, Boston Center membership
growth has outpaced even the best years at the Kenmore Center. An average
of 1,000 new members per month have enrolled in 1985. Ninety-percent of
this growth is due to employer group subscriptions. HCHP has established
a downtown presence ahead of its competitors. In considering plans for
another Boston Center, there are no known plans for future competition.\20
The Boston Center serves a different population than the other HCHP
centers. It was predicted that there would be more adults and fewer
children: a 95%/5% split instead of the 72%/28% split typical at suburban
centers. In reality, 14% of all Boston Center visits are by children,
nearly three times as many as expected. There have been other demographic
surprises. The Center attracts visits from two radically different
socio-economic groups: affluent young urban professionals as predicted,
and poor inner city neighborhood residents. The latter account for a
disproportionate number of pediatric visits. Among all HCHP health
centers, Boston has the highest percentage of females (60%); the highest
percentage of females in their child-bearing years (89%); the highest
demand for mental health services (mostly from women); and the highest
demand for "same day" versus "same doctor" service. (This used to be
called "emergency care" but is now called "convenience care" by HCHP.)
The Boston Center also has the highest percentage of "no-shows" in the
entire HCHP system. Across all departments, the number of missed
appointments totals 25%. Surprisingly, there are even a high number of
-15-
missed obstetric/gynecological and surgical appointments. The high number
of no-shows is the counter-symptom to the high demand for same-day
service. Both are attributable to the pressure under which young urban
professionals, the Boston Center's most numerous members, frequently find
themselves.\21
The actual demographics as they have been born out by the first Boston
Center warrant careful consideration in the planning of the next Boston
Center. There are physical as well as staffing implications. For
instance, the pediatric and gynecological departments need to be much
larger than in the first Boston Center. Not only are a majority of the
downtown members women, but the current mini-baby boom will peak between
1990 and 1995 when the second Boston Center is planned to be opened.
Rapid changes in the HMO industry suggest the need for flexibility as
another important reason for HCHP to own its own real estate. Recent
trends include the following:
1. Health care centers are moving toward administrative autonomy.
2. Administrative and health education services are expanding. Most HMO's
newly offer programs for dental care, pre-natal instruction,
alcoholism, drug abuse, psychological therapy, and nutritional
analysis.
3. Expanded services have increased the average amount of health center
space per member. Older centers offer only 1 square foot per member,
whereas newer centers offer 1.5 to 1.6 square feet per member.
4. Expanded services have required more assembly-type spaces than were
provided in the early centers.
5. Services are increasingly offered to non-members for a fee.\22
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Owning real estate as opposed to leasing it can provide HCHP with the means
to control costs, hedge against inflation, gain a source of additional
revenues, and maintain the flexibility to respond to ever-changing HMO
industry standards. However, there is a fundamental difference between
owning real estate and developing it. That difference is risk. As a
health care insurer, HCHP cannot afford to take risks. But as a big player
in a highly competitive market, HCHP feels pressured to take the risks it
feels it can manage. The next chapter examines the risks, as well as the
potential rewards, associated with each of the three options which HCHP is
considering.
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Chapter 2
ANALYSIS OF THREE DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS
In early 1985, Steffian Bradley Associates devised schematic plans for
development options which they called A, B and C. Exhibit 1 is a reduced
set of these drawings.\1 Each option preserves the historic Bulfinch
warehouse as can be seen in the lower left of these plans. Option A calls
for a building which is 7 stories or approximately 90 feet, the height of
the existing commercial office building. Options B and C calls for
buildings which are 15 stories or approximately 180 feet, including 13
rentable stories plus a 2-story mechanical penthouse.
To accompany their plans, the architects tallied the number of gross
square feet (GSF) provided for each use in the three options. These
square footage figures are presented in Exhibit 2.\2 For purposes of this
analysis, it is assumed that rentable square feet (RSF) are equal to gross
square feet minus any Mechanical, Garage, and Office Lobby areas.
Exhibit 2 gives these rentable areas, as well as assumed 1985 downtown
rent rates for each of the various uses. Note that assumed rent rates for
Option A are $10 per square foot lower than for Options B and C. This is
because Option A is essentially a renovation project -- nearly 70% of the
building is renovated space. Options B and C are essentially new
construction projects -- the buildings respectively contain only 5% and 2%
of space which is renovated.
Based on Steffian Bradley's drawings, and a long-standing working
relationship with both the architect and HCHP, the George Macomber
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Construction Company estimated the cost of each option. These cost
figures are in 1985 dollars and are presented in Exhibit 3 under the line
item "Hard Costs." For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that
"Soft Costs" would total an additional 25% of construction costs.
"Land Costs" are assumed to be the worst case Net Present Value (NPV) of
the ground lease payments plus the "put" purchase price. This worst case
NPV is $4.8 million and occurs in the year 2082, as can be seen in
Exhibit 4.
As noted in Exhibit 3, the Land Cost for Option C is assumed to be double
the Land Costs of Option A or B. This is a conservative assumption based
on the fact that site area of Option C is nearly double the site area of
Option A or B. In reality, HCHP controls the more valuable half of the
site so the Land Cost for Option C should be less than double Option A or
B. HCHP's half is more valuable because it opposes a massive 14-story,
350,000 square foot Art Deco building built in 1928, and therefore has
been tentatively approved by the BRA for development to an FAR of 13 or
14. The adjacent parcel opposes an 8-story, 95,000 square-foot,
Romanesque Revival building built in 1890, and is unlikely to ever be
approved for more than an FAR of 8. The unequal FAR's put HCHP in a
strong position to negotiate a joint venture with the owner of the
adjacent parcel as will be discussed in Chapter 3. But to be prudently
conservative in these financial analyses, especially about Option C which
poses the greatest risks, a double Land Cost is ascribed to Option C.
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Noted in Exhibit 3 as well, is that Total Project Costs for Options B
and C include a substantial figure for Lease-Up Deficit. It is assumed
that it will take 2-1/2 years from construction completion before the
office and retail space in these buildings is 85% leased, allowing for
15% structural vacancy. It is also assumed that the buildings would fill
up in such a way as would make the lost rent over this period comparable
to 100% office and retail vacancy for a solid year.
Exhibit 5 presents an analysis of the real estate values created by each
of the three options. Value here is defined as the difference between the
total project cost and the potential sales price of the completed project
leased to stabilized occupancy. It is assumed that Option A would have no
vacancy because it is occupied in its entirety by the HCHP health center.
It is assumed that Options B and C would have 15% vacancy in all office
and retail areas, an estimate of what structural vacancy levels in Boston
will average over the next decade. For all three options, it is assumed
that upon sale, HCHP's rent would rise to market office rates -- $25 per
square foot in Option A, and $35 per square foot in Options B and C.
Potential sales price is calculated by dividing the Net Operating Income
(NOI) by a capitalization factor of between 8% and 10%. Potential value
creation is then given as a range. In reality, Option A would likely be
capped at 8% because of HCHP's single long-term tenancy. Options B and C
would likely be capped at 9% or 10%.
This way of defining value is convenient and traditional for financial
analysis, but it leaves aside less determinant types of value such as
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manageable risks -- financial, marketing and construction, appropriate
physical "fit" for health center operations, needed expansion
capabilities, and desired community image. These other values are
important points of comparison between the options, and will be addressed
shortly.
The message of Exhibit 5 is that Option A is an inviable project from the
viewpoint of financial return. In other words, it would cost between $2.1
and $4.6 million more to build Option A than the amount for which it could
be immediately resold. Negative value is created by Option A. Option B
is a different case; it is viable, though not likely to yield fantastic
returns. If sold at a Cap Rate as low as 8%, Option B would yield $7.1
million over a total project cost of $26.4 million, or a 27% profit. If
sold at a more realistic Cap Rate of 10%, however, it would yield
$431,068, only a 2% profit. Option C is by far the most potentially
profitable project. If sold at the realistic Cap Rate of 10%, the project
which costs $45.8 million would yield $5.9 million, or a 13% profit. At a
more favorable lower Cap Rate of 8%, the project would yield $18.8
million, or a 41% profit.
The Return on Asset (ROA) percentages denote at what Cap Rate each project
needs to sell in order to break even. There are three basic reasons for
the comparative advantage of Option C. First, Land Cost is in line with
the Total Project Cost -- 21% -- much more reasonable than Option A's 33%,
but not much higher than Option B's 18%. Second, Option C's Total Gross
Income is fed by the highest proportion of high paying uses -- office and
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retail. Option A, in fact, benefits from none of this income. Third, and
most importantly, Option C has the lowest per square foot construction
cost by far -- $89 -- as opposed to $122 for Option A, and $117 for
Option B. The bottom line of Exhibit 5 called "Maximum Value Creation"
can be seen as a distillation of these three points of comparison.
Exhibit 6 contrasts the likely financing scenarios of each project
assuming a construction start in 1987. Note that Total Project Costs have
escalated from those in 1985 dollars presented in Exhibit 5. Option A has
an equity requirement of $2.2 million, and a debt requirement of
$8.6 million. Since the entire project will be occupied by HCHP, it is
assumed that the entire debt could be raised by the sale of low-cost HEFA
revenue bonds. The interest rate on these bonds is assumed to average
8%. Options B and C have equity requirements of $4.8 million and $8.1
million respectively. Of their debt requirements of $19.2 million and
$32.2 million respectively, it is assumed that only an amount in
proportion to the square footage which HCHP actually occupies in the
buildings could qualify for HEFA bond financing. The additional debt is
assumed to be raised by a conventional market-rate loan at an interest
rate of 14%. The key figures in Exhibit 6 correspond to the marginal
notes in Exhibit 7.
Exhibit 7 presents 10-Year Cash Flow Projections for Options A, B and C.
These projections are all based on identical assumptions which are as
follows:
1. The developer of the project is assumed to be a tax-paying entity
which takes full advantage of depreciation and interest deductions. This
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entity might take any number of forms: a for-profit investment subsidiary
of HCHP; a joint venture in which HCHP is a 1% general partner and any
number of tax-paying investors are 99% limited partners; a joint venture
between HCHP and a developer (in which case, for purposes of the project,
HCHP's tax-exempt status would be eclipsed by the tax-paying status of its
partner); or a developer to whom HCHP assigns its ground lease in return
for a bargain lease-back rate. All four of these deal structures are
possible, and are discussed in Chapter 3.
2. Rental rates and operating expenses are based on guess-timates of what
the 1985 market would pay for space in this location. Option A rents are
$10 per square foot lower than Option B and C rents, reflecting the fact
that Option A is comprised of 70% renovated space. Rents are assumed to
inflate at a compounded rate of 3% annually, lagging behind operating
expenses which are assumed to inflate at a compounded rate of 5%
annually. All non-HCHP leases are assumed to be written for 5-year
terms. Parking is assumed to have no vacancy and no lease-up deficit.
Parking rents are assumed to be raised annually.
3. Regardless of whether HCHP is in any way the developer, it is assumed
that HCHP will pay rent for the space it occupies with its lobby and
health center. In recognition of its pre-construction commitment to lease
space, HCHP is given a preferred rental rate at a $5 per square foot
discount in 1985 dollars -- $20 per square foot in Option A, and $30 per
square foot in Options B and C.
4. Rental rates reflect the different percentages of renovated as opposed
to new space in each of the three options, but not the different floor
sizes. In reality, this factor might dictate a few dollars higher rent
for Option C which offers 23,000 square-foot floors, and a few dollars
lower rent for Option A which offers 4,700 square-foot floors.
5. Construction is assumed to start on January 1, 1987 and to be finished
18 months later, on July 1, 1988. Lease terms for HCHP and all other
tenants are assumed to start at construction completion. It is
anticipated that it will take 2-1/2 years to lease 85% of the office and
retail space in Options B and C. A figure for this Lease-Up Deficit is
built into the Total Project Costs for these options.
6. Each of the three options has a 2-year, interest-only construction
loan which is funded for 80% of Hard and Soft Costs. Average outstanding
balance is assumed to be 50% of the loan amount in the first year, and
100% of the loan amount in the second year.
7. Permanent financing is assumed to be obtained for 80% of the Hard and
Soft Costs. Debt Coverage Ratios included in Exhibit 6 indicate that this
degree of financing is a reasonable expectation for Option C, but not for
Options A and B. It is assumed that HCHP has access to low-cost capital
through HEFA tax-exempt revenue bonds, but only for that portion of the
building which HCHP will actually occupy.\13 Thus, only Option A benefits
from 8% financing for the entire project. Options B and C benefit from
some 8% bonds, but are largely financed by loans at a market rate of 14%.
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8. Ground rent is assumed to be paid out of HCHP's operating cash flow.
"Put" purchase money may be needed in any year, and is assumed to be
raised out of HCHP's capital reserves and bank credit lines.
9. Certain provisions of the new Federal Tax Act now under consideration
are assumed to be in effect. Tax Shelter Benefits are based on the
maximum tax rate of 35%. Hard Costs are depreciated over 18 years; Soft
Costs over 10 years.
10. It is assumed that the 25% Investment Tax Credit (ITC) for historic
rehabilitation will still be available when the project is complete in
1989. (Both existing buildings on the site are more than 40 years old and
located within a certified historic district.) Accordingly, it is assumed
that a 25% rebate will be applied to those Hard and Soft Costs which are
in proportion to the number of renovated square feet within each project
11. The equity needed for each option is assumed to be 20% of the Hard
Costs, Soft Costs, and Lease-Up Deficit. In reality, additional equity
might be needed for such things as construction cost overruns, free rent,
and replacement reserves.
The 10-Year Cash Flow Projection is an extremely important tool, not only
for purposes of HCHP's financial planning, but for purposes of delineating
differences between the three development options. The spread sheets in
Exhibit 7 convey the following information:
Average
Return Measure Over Option A Option B Option C
Return on Asset (NOI/TPC) 9 yrs 3.68% 9.05% 10.47%
Return on Equity (BTCF/EQ) 9 yrs -32.62% -3.13% 6.23%
Debt Coverage Ratio 9 yrs .46 .95 1.11
NPV of After Tax CF @ 10% 13 yrs -2,799,164 -3,032,674 -2,126,960
IRR of After Tax CF 13 yrs -174.64% -8.62% 2.88%
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It is clear that of the three options under consideration, only Option C
offers attractive financial returns over the time frame of the analysis.
Specifically, Option C offers 10-1/2% average Return on Asset, and 6-1/4%
average Return on Equity, under the extremely conservative assumptions of
a 2-1/2 year lease-up period and a 15% structural vacancy level.
Admittedly, these assumptions are very conservative, and they present each
option under a worst-case scenario. Until recently, much more aggressive
assumptions could be made. Pro-formas for office projects in this
location typically carried a 1 year lease-up period and 5% vacancy. These
formerly common assumptions are no longer valid because new downtown
office construction will vastly exceed absorption over the next few
years. While it is not clear what new assumptions are prudent, it is
important to realize that the extremely conservative assumptions
underlying Exhibit 7 particularly penalize Option C. This is because
Option C has proportionately more leasable office and retail space than
either Options A or B. More aggressive assumptions about lease-up or
vacancy would make Option C look comparatively even better. Option A
would be unaffected, and Option B would improve, but not as much as
Option C.
At the same time, Option C is the only option which has an acceptable Debt
Coverage Ratio. With the guarantee of HCHP as a major long-term tenant, a
Debt Coverage Ratio of 1.11 should be acceptable to most lenders. If not,
HCHP may be required to contribute more equity than the $8 million which
represents 20% of the Total Project Cost. Surprisingly, Option A which
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has 80% financing at below-market rates, has a Debt Coverage Ratio of only
.46. This is because Option A's Building Revenues do not benefit from
having market leases turn, and so after five years, Ground Rent payments
exceed Net Operating Income. As a result, Net Operating Income less
Ground Rent, the figure which usually offsets Debt Service, is
increasingly negative over the life of the project, and no Debt Service of
any amount can be supported. This makes it virtually impossible to
finance Option A with a direct-reduction mortgage instrument of 30 years,
a disadvantage which makes it difficult to seriously consider Option A.
Option B benefits from below-market rate financing for roughly half its
Total Project Cost, and yet it has a Debt Coverage Ratio of only .95.
Because lenders are almost certain to require a Debt Coverage Ratio
greater than 1, HCHP would likely have to contribute more than 20% of the
Total Project Cost in order to build Option B. This would lower
Option B's Return on Equity, and reduce the difference in equity
requirements between Options B and C, again making Option C look more
attractive.
Despite their different equity requirements, each of the three options
represents nearly the same cash flow drain over 13 years. This point is
made by a comparison of the NPV figures. Interestingly, these are all
negative within $900,000 of each other. At -$2.1 million, Option C
represents the least severe drain, but a drain nonetheless. It should be
noted that the NPV discount rate of 10% is somewhat aggressive given that
long-term Treasury notes are currently yielding only 7.75%. If Option C's
After-Tax Cash Flow were discounted at 7.75%, the NPV over 13 years would
be -$1.6 million.
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The three IRR's differ according to the extent to which cash flows are
positive after the first stabilized year. The continuously negative cash
flows in Option A produce a very negative IRR, while the continously
positive cash flows in Options B and C yield higher figures. Only
Option C has a positive IRR. This indicates the comparative strength of
Option C's cash flows relative to HCHP's equity in this option,
andreinforces the message of Exhibit 5 which analyzed the potential
creation of value by capping Net Operating Income. Still, Option C has an
IRR of less than 3% over 13 years. While a longer time frame would boost
this rate, it must must be recognized that from strict financial point of
view, Option C is not as good an investment as many others, real estate
and otherwise, which HCHP could choose to make.
HCHP can lease its present 50,000 square-foot downtown Health Center at
the rate of $14.75 per square foot until mid-1994. Discounted at 10%, the
Net Present Value of the nine remaining lease payments of $737,500 each is
roughly -$4.7 million. Compared with leasing, Option C represents a Net
Present Value savings of approximately $2.6 million. It may be tempting
to justify building of any of the options, particularly Option C by this
reasoning. HCHP must not fall into this trap. What justifies Option C is
that under extremely conservative assumptions, it promises an average
6-1/4% Return on Equity. Under more aggressive assumptions, it will yield
higher rates than those presently offered by secure, straightforward
investments such as U.S. Treasury notes.
It is operative law in real estate that rewards are proportionate with
risks. HCHP's three options are no exception to this rule. Option A is
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clearly the least risky, while Option C has considerable risks. There are
at least seven categories of risks to consider: approvals, financing,
construction, marketing, management, public image, and physical
suitability for health center operations.
Approvals: The BRA has tentatively approved the height and massing of
Option B, and even encouraged HCHP to study Option C. However, there is a
risk that the BRA will withhold final approval from either of these
options.
For one thing, the Landmarks Commission has yet to be approached with the
plans. This City body has preempted the BRA's position on two recent
downtown projects, causing both serious delays in developers' schedules
and drastic alterations to their designs. The Landmarks Commission has
published its own criteria for future development within the historic
Custom House District. In the Boston Preservation Alliance Newsletter of
October 1983, the Landmarks Commission critiqued a proposal for the
development of a 5 to 6-story infill building next to two Bulfinch
warehouses just north of HCHP's lot. Interestingly, the developer who
proposed the building was one and the same who owns the other half of
HCHP's Option C parcel. The Landmarks Commission declared that that
building should "complement Bulfinch's design by using the same materials,
and a similar massing and facade treatment but in a modern idiom."\4
Undoubtedly, the Commission would have more to say about HCHP's Option B
or C, both of which are 15-story buildings which involve tearing down an
existing 7-story, turn-of-the-century commercial building -- albeit of
undistinguished architectural character.
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For another thing, the Massachusetts Historical Commission has yet to be
approached about HCHP's plans. It has authority to review projects when
development projects, which affect properties listed on the National or
State Register of Historic Places, involve federal or state monies. (The
Custom House District has National Register status, and so its individual
properties automatically have State Register status.) Accordingly, any
developer wishing to claim an ITC for historic renovation must demonstrate
compliance with the State guidelines for such. The Massachusetts
Historical Commission has recently demonstrated its power in delaying and
reducing the mass of a major development on the Boston harborfront. Those
developers were effectively prohibited from building a hotel which was an
important component of their plan. HCHP's Options might be similarly
eroded under the review by the Massachusetts Historical Commission. While
the financial feasibility of Options B or C is not fundamentally affected
by disqualification for an ITC, that of Option A is.
Finally, the BRA may be swayed by neither of these other powerful groups,
but by public opinion at large. The Mayor, increasingly sensitive to
criticism that he is as pro-business and pro-downtown growth as his
predecessor, may instruct his BRA Director to stall approvals for further
downtown projects until after the next election in the fall of 1987.
Ardent preservationists may publicly decry all of HCHP's options as
"prosthetic architecture," -- and for their razing of an existing
building, Options B and C as "wanton destruction of our architectural and
commercial heritage." Proponents of light and air may charge that Broad
Street is becoming "cavernous and dark," and find ammunition in the shadow
studies which Steffian Bradley has been asked to prepare. Citizens
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concerned about the already serious downtown traffic problem may argue for
a moratorium on new development, at least until the depressed Central
Artery and Third Harbor Tunnel are built. Proponents of parking may
condemn the BRA for allowing the number of downtown parking spaces to
decrease while millions of additional square feet of office space are
added. Furthermore, the BRA may enforce a universal parking requirement
of one space per 1,000 square feet for all future downtown development.
Every recent downtown development has to manage this kind of dissension.
The bigger the project, the more vociferous and persistent the
opposition. Public pressure to thwart the project may be neutralized by
the Mayor's desire to exact linkage payments for politically strategic
neighborhood projects and to increase tax revenues before the 1987
election. He could best fulfill this desire by supporting Options B
or C. Presumably, HCHP would pay taxes only on Options B or C which
contain speculative office and retail space, and linkage only on Option C
which has speculative space in excess of the 100,000 square feet which are
exempt under the current linkage formula. Thus, although HCHP's Options B
and C will draw more fire from the anti-growth interest groups, they offer
the City a clear cut financial reason to support them. However, the
closer HCHP's quest for approvals is to the next election, the more likely
the City is to delay the process simply to avoid controversy.
Financing: There are three major financial risks which affect all
development projects, and which affect HCHP's three options in proportion
with their costs. These are the risks that HCHP will not be able to come
up with all of the equity money, that construction loan interest rates
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will be higher than expected, and that HEFA bond interest rates will be
higher than expected. An added risk is that HEFA may not issue bonds for
any project containing speculative office and retail space. Options B
and C would then have to be entirely financed at market rates and would
not be eligible, as this study assumes, for HEFA funding for just the
HCHP-occupied portions of each project.
Construction: There are construction risks inherent in all options posed
by the fact that the site is filled land. Before Bulfinch transformed it
into a new commercial district of unified warehouses, Broad Street was
once a district of helter-skelter wharves at the edge of Boston Harbor.
The land was filled in 1805 by a group of prominent businessmen organized
under the name of the Broad Street Association. Test borings being taken
in the summer of 1985 should confirm the bearing capacity of the soil. If
it is sub-standard, expensive foundations may need to be designed,
particularly to support 15-story Options B and C.
Another construction risk is posed by the difficulty of excavating
immediately adjacent to existing structures. This is an extremely serious
risk when the adjacent structures are historic. Not only are they
irreplaceable landmarks, but they pre-date accurate engineering
construction documents so their true strength and composition can only be
guessed at. Option A disturbs existing historic buildings the least,
requiring only partial demolition of four exterior walls and shallow
foundations. Options B and C, on the other hand, cause considerable
disturbance to the entire site, requiring demolition of the existing
7-story commercial building, excavation for two new levels of below-grade
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parking below the water table, and deep foundations of some kind. It will
be a tricky matter to protect and preserve the Bulfinch warehouse on
location; dismantling and reconstructing it may be safer. And unless the
site is expertly shored and dewatered, off-site structures may be caused
to settle. By reputation at least, HCHP's architects and contractors are
well-qualified to manage these risks.
Marketing: Of all the options, only Option A poses no leasing risk in
that it is occupied in entirety by HCHP. Options B and C produce 50,000
and 156,00 square feet of surplus space respectively. While the task of
renting these modest areas might seem simple, several statistics suggest
that it may be difficult unless the building offers below market rents or
unusual amenities.
Many real estate analysts predict that Boston will experience an office
vacancy rate which steadily increases to as high as 15% during the years
1985-1990. If built to open in mid-1988, HCHP's project would competing
with nine major projects which are tentatively planned to be completed in
1987. As shown in Exhibit 8, together these nine projects will provide
more than 5,100,000 square feet of office space and 359,000 square feet of
retail space.\5 As shown in Exhibit 9, office space in Boston has only
been absorbed at a rate of 1,083,793 square feet a year during 1970-1984,
and in 1984 there were 2,765,000 square feet or 2.6 years worth of
unleased new space.\6
At 9,000 square feet per floor, Option B is unlikely to sell to large
space-users. Small professional offices are more likely tenants and
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should be approached as early as possible about pre-construction
commitment. At that, perhaps the building should be promoted as one which
offers shared secretarial services and conference facilities. Option C
offers somewhat more marketing flexibility. It contains 22,000 square
feet per floor for its bottom half, and 12,000 square feet per floor for
its top half. However, with three times more surplus space than Option C,
it represents a greater risk in a softening market.
Management: Option A would be both the easiest development and the
easiest building to manage, leaving aside any unexpected problems which
could be encountered in renovating the existing 7-story commercial
building. It is within HCHP's reach to put up all the equity, and to
carry out the development with its own in-house expertise supplemented by
a few outside consultants.
Option B would be somewhat more difficult to manage although still
possible by HCHP alone, acting with consultants during the development
phase, and property managers during the operations phase. Option B's
equity requirement of $4 million could probably not be met out of the
operating budget and HCHP would face acquiring some equity investors.
This would complicate the project somewhat, requiring HCHP to pay equity
placement fees and produce quarterly reports to investors. Equity shares
might be placed in-house, offered for instance to HCHP staff and members
in units of $5,000 or $10,000.
Option C would be a difficult development to manage, particularly with
respect to negotiating for rights to the adjoining parcel and obtaining
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approvals for so large a project in this location. The lease-up period
would also be difficult. Not only will competition for tenants be fierce,
but the present design has the new health center sharing floors with
tenant space which would likely not be finished until after HCHP had
already moved in. If a satisfactory joint venture arrangement can be
struck between HCHP and a developer, perhaps the owner/developer of the
adjoining parcel, these management risks may be partly borne by parties
other than HCHP.
Public Image: HCHP's real estate consultant of many years explains that
one of HCHP's only public image problems has been caused by their
tax-exempt status. Communities which are desperate for tax dollars have
been loath to approve facilities for non-profits which bring them no
revenues. No free rides say cities.\7 To counter this problem, any of
the three options for HCHP's new downtown center could be developed by a
tax-paying HCHP affiliate. This would both mitigate the organization's
major public image problem, and allow the sale or sharing of depreciation
and interest deductions. It is assumed to the extent each option provides
for occupancy by an HCHP Health Center, the project could be still be
financed with HEFA tax-exempt revenue bonds.
Physical Suitability for Health Center Operations: HCHP's three options
differ drastically in how they accommodate the new Health Center. Option
A locates the Center on seven floors, five of 9,000-10,000 square feet and
two of 4,700 square feet. These upper floors are "peanut" size, to borrow
the expression used by one HCHP Administrator in describing the present
Boston Center which has ten floors each of 5,000 square feet.\8 Not only
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the three options for HCHP's new downtown center could be developed by a
tax-paying HCHP affiliate. This would both mitigate the organization's
major public image problem, and allow the sale or sharing of depreciation
and interest deductions. It is assumed to the extent each option provides
for occupancy by an HCHP Health Center, the project could be still be
financed with HEFA tax-exempt revenue bonds.
Physical Suitability for Health Center Operations: HCHP's three options
differ drastically in how they accommodate the new Health Center. Option
A locates the Center on seven floors, five of 9,000-10,000 square feet and
two of 4,700 square feet. These upper floors are "peanut" size, to borrow
the expression used by one HCHP Administrator in describing the present
Boston Center which has ten floors each of 5,000 square feet.\8 Not only
would Option A require HCHP to shoe-horn its operations into a renovated
building, much as it has just finished doing to create the present
facility, but also Option A would provide no room for expansion.
Expansion may be necessary for any of three reasons: to accommodate more
than the 40,000 members for which the Center is presently targeted, to
provide more than 1.5 square feet per member as HMO industry standards
increase, or to house new technical equipment or clinical spaces as
medical techniques advance.
Option B locates the Health Center much like Option A, on seven floors of
9,000 square feet, six of them full floors. There are two main
differences: the Health Center occupies only half, not the full ground
floor, and the six and seventh floors are the same as the rest, not
"1peanut" size. Expansion could be accommodated vertically in Option B.
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chance of financial reward. Option C poses the greatest risks, but ones
which HCHP can manage by involving investors or joint venture partners,
and by having consultants who are thoroughly aware of the potential
problems from the outset. Unfortunately, under worst-case assumptions,
Option C does not promise returns which are higher than those offered by
highly secure non-real estate investments. This raises the question of
whether HCHP is able to risk more aggressive assumptions, or should
consider other investments. Chapter 4 will show that under more
aggressive assumptions, Option C definitely has the potential to
outperform other investments, but it will recommend Option C only if HCHP
and its consultants commit themselves to achieving these more aggressive
assumptions.
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Chapter 3
OPPORTUNITIES FOR CREATIVE DEAL STRUCTURING
To date, HCHP has financed and managed the development of all of its real
estate assets fully on its own. The explosive growth of the 1980's gave
impetus to the establishment of a formal HCHP Real Estate Department under
the Vice President for Corporate Development. Presently the Department
consists of a director, in-house counsel, and several project and
construction managers. The Department is expert at administering HCHP's
physical expansion plans -- in determining the best "fit" of design and
construction solutions with HCHP's membership and clinical goals, and
enforcing the timely realization of these solutions. However, the
Department lacks both the expertise and the mandate to formulate strategy
about property acquisition and deal structures. As a consequence, HCHP
depends heavily on its outside real estate consultant for strategy.
The nature of the real estate consultant's contractual relationship with
HCHP, makes it very difficult for the consultant to propose alternative
strategies for HCHP's real estate projects. For one thing, the consultant
is engaged on a project-by-project basis. This discourages a broad view
of HCHP's goals and interests. For another thing, the consultant
interacts primarily with the director of the Real Estate Department. This
means that prospective deals tend to be evaluated in terms of real estate
returns, not in terms of broad HMO policy questions such as other HCHP
executives might ask. Meanwhile, someone should be asking questions like
how threatened is the utilization reserve by the a multi-million dollar
lease-up deficit associated with a speculative office development?
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Finally, the consultant and HCHP Real Estate Director both have to cope
with extraordinary time pressures brought about by multiple HCHP projects
being done at once. HCHP's explosive growth has caused facilities to be
needed so fast, that the consultant has neither been asked to study
alternative deal structures for many projects, nor to evaluate the general
strategy by which HCHP should become involved in real estate in the
future.
Regardless of what and where HCHP decides to build it, the new downtown
Health Center will be more costly and risky than any of HCHP's previous
projects. Accordingly the project may require more equity than HCHP can
or should prudently risk. It may compromise the organization's image as a
simple non-profit. It may overextend HCHP's management resources and make
the organization even more reliant on the expertise of outside
consultants. If delayed beyond the lease term of HCHP's present downtown
health center, it may force HCHP to pay a premium price for an interim
arrangement. There are deal structures which would mitigate these costs
and risks, while still enabling HCHP to meet most of its financial and
operational goals. The following deal structures merit consideration, not
only as possibilities for this particular project, but as models by which
HCHP may wish to consider undertaking all real estate projects in the
future. While these deal structures are described with reference to HCHP,
they are generally applicable to real estate projects by all kinds of
non-profit organizations.
HCHP For-Profit Real Estate Affiliate: HCHP's has extremely strong ties
to academe, making it extremely unlikely that it will ever transmute and
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become a for-profit organization. Nonetheless, this prospect is regularly
discussed by HCHP administrators who are anxious to better compete in the
increasingly competitive health care market. While HCHP's Board may never
change the nature of the basic organization, it has not withheld its
consent and support for a for-profit affiliate organization.
Late in 1984, HCHP founded Managed Care Corporation (MCC). The story
provides a useful model in considering how HCHP might diversify into real
estate. HCHP established MCC to develop, own and manage alternative
health-care delivery systems nationally. While MCC is an independent
company, financed primarily by venture capital, HCHP is its largest single
shareholder and controls four representatives on MCC's seven-member board
of directors. HCHP's president serves as chairman of MCC's board. The
mission of MCC in its early years is to form partnerships with
high-quality pre-paid health care providers throughout the country, and to
offer management services -- financial management, information services,
utilization review, marketing, and claims processing -- to collaborative
enterprises.\l
A similar for-profit affiliate could enable HCHP to resolve the dilemma it
has always faced when investing in real estate as a non-profit. On the
one hand, HCHP has always had access to low-cost capital in the form of
tax-free revenue bonds. On the other hand, HCHP has never been able to
take advantage of tax deductions for interest and depreciation,
traditionally a very significant component of real estate returns.
-39-
Being non-profit has saved HCHP anywhere between 2% and 5% on permanent
financing interest rates. Exhibit 10 shows what would happen if HCHP
could not qualify for any HEFA bonds in developing the proposed downtown
center under any of the three options. This might be the case if HEFA
disallowed the intended use of the capital because of the speculative
office component of the project, if HEFA challenged the non-profit status
of the applicant, or if HCHP's revenues slumped below those needed to
underwrite the amount being financed. It is clear from Exhibit 10 that
having to obtain market rate interest would seriously diminish the cash
flow and overall returns under any of the three development scenarios.
Unfortunately, HCHP's non-profit status has a major disadvantage which
affects all non-profits holding real estate. The organization is unable
to take advantage of tax deductions. In 1984 alone, this caused HCHP to
forgo deductions for $2 million in interest expense and $2.6 million in
depreciation.\2 At the marginal tax rate of 50% which was then in effect,
this represents a value of $2.3 million which was lost -- more than the
amount needed to cover HCHP's entire annual debt service for that year.
When HCHP is viewed as one of the many aspirants to property in the
hottest real estate market in the country, it is clear that HCHP is at a
disadvantage in bidding for speculative office building sites. This
disadvantage is only partly neutralized by HCHP's access to low cost
financing and exemption from real estate taxes, because these advantages
apply only to HCHP-occupied space. Reasonably, HCHP cannot bid as much as
a bidder who can take advantage of the unique tax deductions offered by
real estate.
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It is clear then that the perfect deal structure for any of HCHP's three
options would be one in which the major advantage of HCHP's non-profit
status is preserved, while the value of the tax deductions it might
otherwise forgo is captured.
If HCHP were to establish a for-profit real estate affiliate, it could in
a sense become its own for-profit developer. The main HCHP organization
would still be able to pledge its revenues and obtain low-cost financing
for the square footage intended to be occupied by the new Health Center.
In return for this, the real estate affiliate would lease 50,000 square
feet to the main HCHP organization at a fixed feet for the duration of the
ground lease. The for-profit affiliate could sell the allowable
depreciation and interest deductions in the form of limited partnership
interests in HCHP's new downtown center, perhaps structuring limited
partnerships to syndicate all of HCHP's other real estate holdings. The
advantage in doing this is shown in Exhibit 11. The various tax
deductions allowable under each of the three options are totalled, and
then discounted at the inflation rate of 6%. The result is a Net Present
Value figure, 35% of which can be realized as tax shelter benefits by
investors in the maximum tax bracket. Assuming that an investor would be
willing to pay $.85 for every $1.00 of anticipated tax savings, thus
locking in a 15% return, HCHP's real estate affiliate could raise amount
of equity shown in Exhibit 11.
HCHP Limited Partnership: Another option is for HCHP to sell limited
partnership interests directly, without creating a for-profit affiliate.
Conceptually, HCHP could be a small percentage General Partner, thus
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retaining full control of the project while putting up only a small
percentage of the equity, and individual or corporate investors could be
large percentage Limited Partners, thus deriving a large percentage of the
potential project benefits -- cash flow, tax losses, and residual benefits
-- in return for their putting up a large percentage of the equity.
Potentially this poses a serious threat to HCHP's academic, community
service image. Health care and syndication may seem an unprincipled,
unsavory combination. However, limited partnership interests could be
promoted sensitively -- as vital to the cause of reasonably-priced health
care and insurance -- perhaps restricted to among HCHP's members and
staff. If the image problem could be avoided, an HCHP Limited Partnership
could be one way in which HCHP could more readily undertake this project
independently.
Sale/Lease-Back Transaction: Unfortunately, changes in the recent tax
code make sale/lease-backs a very unattractive way for non-profits to
undertake real estate projects. The applicable rules are in Section 31 of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, under "Tax-Exempt Entity Leasing."
These rules apply to property which is a) financed directly or indirectly
by obligations the interest on which is tax-exempt; b) leased back under
terms which establish a fixed or determinable purchase price; c) leased
back for longer than 20 years; or d) sold and leased back by a tax-exempt
entity after it has already used the property; and e) more than 35% leased
to the tax-exempt entity. Two rules in particular would make it very
uneconomic for HCHP to structure a sale/lease-back: 1) depreciation on
real property which is part of a sale/lease-back must be based on a
40-year recovery period using the straight line method (versus a 15-year
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recovery period using the ACRS tables for qualifying taxable
organizations); and 2) tax-exempt entities are prohibited from passing
along investment tax credits of any kind, including those for
rehabilitation.\3
Only Option C offers HCHP the possibility of leasing back less than 35% of
the building. As schematically designed, the health center and half the
garage total just 30% of the gross building area. HCHP could avoid
triggering the unattractive depreciation rules by leasing only this amount
of space. Unfortunately, it would still be the case that HCHP could draw
on no HEFA financing for the project, and could only lease-back that
portion of the building for 20 years. Meanwhile, expansion needs could
not be accommodated without exceeding the 35% threshold which triggers the
reduced depreciation rule and ITC restriction. The sale/lease-back
transaction is probably not a workable deal structure for this project.
Joint Venture: Unquestionably, this is the deal structure which offers
the richest (in some sense literally the richest) possibilities. HCHP
would protect its Simon-pure image and get an ideally expandable facility
without risking equity capital which it needs for utilization reserves.
If the deal is structured properly, HCHP maintains 100% control of the
land, and has the right to buy the facility at any time. The joint
venture developer would receive the opportunity to build a mid-rise office
structure which the BRA has tentatively encouraged -- in Boston, one of
the hottest real estate markets in the country. The situation is made
that much more attractive by virtue of the fact that the project already
has a prime tenant; HCHP comes with the development opportunity. Not only
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does this mitigate the developer's lease-up risk, but it makes financing
easier and less expensive.
During the summer over which this thesis is being prepared, HCHP's real
estate consultant has negotiated an innovative joint venture deal with
their client -- a deal which will undoubtedly set an important precedent
for all of HCHP's future real estate projects, particularly the new
downtown health center. For the last few years, HCHP has found its
administrative offices at the Kenmore Center increasingly cramped, and has
desired to find 70,000 square feet of suitable office space for a new
administrative center off-site. In the spring of 1985, HCHP's real estate
consultants found an office property which was perfectly suitable except
it was twice the 70,000 square feet which HCHP needed. The real estate
consultants proposed the following deal to HCHP's President and Chief
Executive Officer:
1. HCHP writes a letter of intent to enter into a long-term lease for
half the space in the building.
2. On the strength of HCHP's letter commitment and HCHP's cash equity
contribution of $600,000, the real estate consultant buys the property
-- land and 140,000 square-foot office building -- obtaining a
market-rate loan for purchase money, improvements to the base
building, and tenant improvements.
3. The real estate consultant then assigns the land to HCHP in order to
take advantage of HCHP's exemption from property taxes. In return,
HCHP gives the real estate consultant a dollar-a-year ground lease,
and a co-terminus long-term lease for 70,000 square feet, half the
space in the building.
4. HCHP rent starts out at higher than market rates, but gradually
diminishes to below market rates. Accordingly, HCHP is imputed to be
making an additional equity contribution of $1.9 million based on the
difference between two Net Present Value figures -- the NPV of what
HCHP will pay the real estate consultant over the first 10 years, and
the NPV of what an independent real estate broker/consultant says are
expectable rents in the solid low-end market over that time.
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5. Cash flow representing a 10% preferred return-on-equity is split
35%/65% between HCHP and the real estate consultant.
6. Any remaining cash flow is split 50%/50%.
7. Upon sale or refinancing, HCHP gets a preferred return of its $2.5
million attributed equity, and a 50%/50% split of any capital gain
after the real estate consultant's equity is returned.
8. Having a 100% long-term leasehold in the building and the
improvements, the real estate consultant takes 100% of the
depreciation and interest deductions.
9. HCHP can buy the building and improvements for its appraised value at
any time, and has the right of first refusal throughout its lease.
The CEO's reaction to this proposed deal was apparently extremely
favorable. He and the majority of his Board of Directors have long sought
to keep HCHP out of the real estate business, but to give the organization
control over its physical facilities and costs. They saw this deal as an
excellent means to that end, as well as an opportunity to bolster their
revenues with a share of the cash flow. Therefore, they voted to move
forward with it and wrote the letter of intent. This induced their real
estate consultant to purchase the property just this last week.\4
This promises to be a beneficial deal for both HCHP and the real estate
consultant. HCHP fixes its costs, and has the possibility of earning 10%
or more on its investment. The real estate consultant puts up no cash,
and acquires a building with a long-term, 70,000 square-foot tenant at
rents initially above market. As the deal is structured, HCHP takes
virtually no risk. Instead, it is the real estate consultant's
responsibility to meet the mortgage obligation, fund construction cost
overruns, lease 70,000 square feet of surplus office space, and cover the
development costs of up-front time and expenses. The real estate
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consultant's incentive is a high return for no money down. The NPV of the
before-tax cash flow discounted at 10%, assuming refinancing after 10
years, is between $4 and $5 million.
This current deal for HCHP's Plan Management Offices is an excellent model
for the new HCHP downtown health center. Applied to the downtown project
which requires greater equity and poses much greater risks, potentially it
could be even more advantageous to HCHP to have a joint venture developer
partner.
Obviously, one logical choice for a developer partner is the real estate
consultant who has just now sold HCHP on the joint venture model. This is
the same consultant who has worked with HCHP for over thirteen years,
negotiating all of its leases, purchases, and related contracts. There
are definite advantages to this arrangement. The real estate consultant
has a good working relationship with HCHP's architect and contractor; is
thoroughly familiar with and sympathetic to HCHP's administrative and
clinical needs; is knowledgeable about all aspects of the project plans;
and will not drive too tough a bargain because of its vital interests in
on-going consulting work with HCHP. On the other hand, there are
drawbacks to HCHP's joint venturing with the same real estate consultant
on this project. HCHP's loyalty to all its consultants costs it premium
fees and construction prices; problems with the first joint-venture for
the Plan Management offices may taint the workings of a second
joint-venture; the real estate consultant may not have the necessary
equity for the downtown health center; or the real estate consultant may
not have the necessary experience to obtain approvals. To the greatest
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extent possible, HCHP should try to negotiate at arm's length for its
joint venture partner. This means that it should seek competitive
proposals from a number of developers, and if necessary, engage a neutral
third-party to help assess the merits and drawbacks of each proposal.
The only logical joint venture partner for Option C is, of course, the
developer who owns the adjacent parcel on which half the 280,000 square
foot building would be constructed. That developer happens also to be
HCHP's present landlord. In terms of negotiating this deal, this is
something of a mixed blessing. On the positive side, HCHP and the
developer have already established a working relationship. The
Administrator of the present Boston Center has nothing but praise for the
developer as landlord. On the negative side, the developer would seem to
have a strong negotiating position -- having both a very attractive
"BATNA" (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) and an unusual degree
of knowledge about the other party's "BATNA." In other words, the
developer stands to gain as either HCHP's landlord or joint-venture
partner. If HCHP stays the full term of its 10-year lease or longer in
its present facility, the developer will earn a high return on its
original $2.6 million investment in acquiring and renovating that
facility. If on the other hand HCHP decides to share the development
rights to its newly acquired parcel, the developer will be paid the
unamortized portion of its investment as HCHP's termination penalty, be
able to turn over 50,000 square feet of newly renovated space at market
rents, and if chosen as HCHP's joint-venture partner, gain development
rights to a building which is twice the height and more than twice the
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mass of that for which the BRA has tentatively approved the developer's
half of the site.
This particular developer seems anxious to strike a joint-venture deal
with HCHP. Twice in the last two months, the developer has called HCHP's
real estate consultant with an invitation to start negotiating.
Meanwhile, the BRA has announced new guidelines for downtown development,
including district height limits of between 40' and 155'. These new
guidelines are graphically described in Exhibit 12. If and when the BRA's
guidelines are adopted as law, new construction in the Custom House
District will be limited to 70', the equivalent of only 6 or 7 stories.\5
Newspaper accounts indicate that the proposed guidelines have the support
of many community and business leaders, and that the process of
incorporating the height limits into the City's zoning ordinance will take
18 months to 2 years.
These guidelines upset HCHP's negotiating position with respect to the
adjacent parcel owner, and threaten to prohibit the building of either
Option B or C. Up until now, the BRA has tentatively approved HCHP's site
for an FAR of 12 or 13, and the adjacent site for an FAR of 7 or 8.
Option C conforms to both these FAR's, but cannot be built unless the BRA
approves the heights which these FAR's imply. HCHP must persuade the BRA
to stand by its tentative approvals or HCHP will loose the ability to
negotiate a joint-venture agreement which attributes greater equity to
HCHP than to the adjacent parcel owner, and more importantly, the right to
build anything on its site which makes economic sense.
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Chapter 4
RECOMMENDATIONS
Traditionally, HCHP has had three basic goals for owning real estate:
1. To fix health center occupancy costs as low as possible, far into the
future as possible, thereby controlling inflation of health care
delivery costs;
2. To insure that facilities will be constructed and managed according to
HCHP's high standards; and,
3. To provide for the possibility of expansion which may be necessary and
desirable for any of the following reasons:
A. The HMO industry evolves to a standard which is greater that the
current average number of square feet per member;
B. The target maximum membership of the Center changes as
center-City demographics change; or
C Medical technology introduces more space consuming equipment or
clinical procedures.
Option A fulfills neither the first nor third goal. As discussed in
Chapter 2, Option A costs more to build than the value it creates, and
produces a series of progressively more and more negative cash flows which
make it virtually impossible to finance. Even assuming a 25% ITC for
historic rehabilitation, Option A's overall Return on Equity is -33%.
In addition, Option A produces a facility which is less ideal for a new
HCHP Health Center. Having small floors, multiple floor levels per floor,
few parking spaces, and no flexibility for expansion, Option A, it is
clear, does not merit further consideration.
Similarly, Option B falls short of the first goal. Looked at statically
in Exhibit 5, Option B appears to offer value in excess of its costs.
Looked at dynamically, however, Option B is not economically viable.
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Exhibit 7 makes it clear that in a soft market, 50,000 square feet of
speculative office and retail space cannot carry the project's high per
square foot construction cost. The Before Tax Cash Flow is negative
despite the fact that the average Debt Coverage Ratio is less than 1.
Accordingly, the Net Present Value over 13 years is -$3 million. For this
amount of money, HCHP can afford to lease downtown space and avoid the
serious approvals, marketing and financing risks which Option B entails.
Option B would produce attractive returns only if its per square foot
construction cost were lower. Unlikely as it is that Option B could ever
be built for as low a cost as Option C, Option B does not deserve further
consideration.
Option C entails substantially the same risks as Option B, but offers much
greater rewards. In addition to meeting HCHP's traditional goals for real
estate -- fixing costs at less than the Net Present Value of leasing
downtown space, and providing a nearly ideal facility from the point of
design and flexibility -- Option C promises to meet a fourth goal:
4. To supplement revenues with returns from diverse investments.
This goal has become primary for all of HCHP's investment decisions, real
estate and otherwise. For the first time since about 1978, HCHP faces
serious economic pressures because of the unfortunate coincidence of a
variety of factors: 1) interest rates have fallen and HCHP is no longer
able to earn a high return on its reserves; 2) insurance rates are at an
all-time high; 3) HCHP membership growth has peaked and is expected to
decline; and 4) the odds are increasing that HCHP's growing and aging
membership will generate numerous claims for serious operations and
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long-term hospital care every year. Symptomatic of these economic
pressures is that HCHP's utilization reserve has had no cumulative surplus
for the past two years.
While this fourth goal is not explicit to real estate, it has important
implications for HCHP's decision about the new downtown Health Center.
First, it suggests that positive cash flow and attractive return measures
must be the final test for any option which meets the other three
criteria. Second, and more importantly, it suggests that any prospective
real estate investment must be evaluated against a broad range of other
possible investment alternatives: U.S. Treasury notes, stocks, bonds,
commodity futures, diverse health-care ventures, and geographic expansion.
Of the three options under consideration, only Option C offers attractive
financial returns comparable with U.S. Treasury notes which are currently
yielding 7-3/4%. As was shown in Exhibit 7, Option C offers a 9-year
average Return on Equity of 10-1/2%, and a 9-year average Return on Asset
of 6-1/4%. These returns are based on extremely conservative, worst-case
assumptions as were presented in Chapter 2. Exhibit 13 examines Option C
under more aggressive assumptions. These assumptions are are as follows:
1. Rents escalate at 5% per year, the same rate as costs.
2. Structural Vacancy is 7-1/2% instead of 15%.
3. The Lease-Up Deficit is equal to 6 months' instead of a full year's
lost office and retail rent.
4. The Land Cost reflects the lower FAR of the adjoining parcel, and is
equal to 1.6 times not 2 times the Land Cost of Options A and B.
5. Interest rates on both the Construction Loan and Market-Rate Permanent
Loan are 12% instead of 14%.
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Under these assumptions, Option C offers considerably more attractive
returns as summarized in the following table:
Average Exhibit 7 Exhibit 12
Over Worst-Case Aggressive
Option C Return Measures Assumptions Assumptions
Return on Asset (NOI/TPC) 9 yrs 10.47% 11.39%
Return on Equity (BTCF/EQ) 9 yrs 6.23% 20.89%
Debt Coverage Ratio 9 yrs 1.11 1.42
NPV of After Tax CF @ 10% 13 yrs -2,126,960 1,596,370
IRR of After Tax CF 13 yrs 2.88% 15.24%
The very attractive returns promised by Exhibit 13 can only be earned if
HCHP aggressively pursues three goals from the outset:
1. Rights to the adjoining parcel for a Net Present Value Cost of not
more than $2.9 million. This figure is 60% of the Net Present Value Cost
of the parcel which HCHP already controls, and reflects the fact that the
adjacent parcel has an FAR of only 8, whereas the parcel HCHP already
controls has an FAR of 14.
2. The most favorable market-rate financing available. This may require
pre-construction leasing commitments for 50,000 square feet of the
speculative office and retail space which is equal to 30% of the non-HCHP
portion of the building. As shown in Exhibit 13, a market-rate loan at
12% instead of 14% results in additional Cash Flow Before Taxes of nearly
$500,000 per year.
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3. Full lease-up within 15 months of construction completion. This will
cut the worst-case Lease-Up Deficit in half, saving $3 million or 6% of
the Total Project Cost in the worst-case scenario.
In brief, if HCHP can achieve these goals, and find a way to take
advantage of 100% of the project's potential tax losses by involving
investors or joint venture partners as described in Chapter 3, Option C
should produce a fine facility with managable risks and a Return on Equity
in the neighborhood of 20%. If HCHP cannot achieve these goals, it is
unlikely that Option C will turn out to be as good an investment as many
others which HCHP could choose to make.
This analysis is premised on assumptions which are carried farther into
the future than these assumptions are sure to hold. As has often been
said, nothing is more certain than change. It will be at least 2 years,
perhaps as long as 7 years, until construction on the new HCHP Health
Center begins. The construction schedule will be determined in part by
the strength of the downtown office market, and in part by the terms of
HCHP's current lease which obliges it both to stay in its present facility
until September 1989, and to pay a termination penalty if it leaves before
September 1994. During this time, anything might happen: the BRA might
enforce a more restrictive downtown height limit than assumed in Option C;
the City might adopt an exorbitant linkage formula and make no exceptions
for projects sponsored by tax-exempt entities; interest rates might once
again climb past 20%; and the downtown office market might deteriorate to
Houston-like vacancies and lease-up periods.
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HCHP should start now to do several things in order to make an informed
decision about whether to stay or move closer to the expiration of the
lease on its present facility:
Gain Control of the Adjacent Parcel: Without the additional land,
Option C cannot be considered. The owner of the adjacent parcel has
recently expressed his willingness to negotiate. HCHP should realize that
the adjacent parcel is virtually undevelopable at the FAR of 8 for which
it has been approved. Both parties stand to gain advantage by reaching an
agreement. A complicating factor is that the adjacent parcel owner is
owner is HCHP's landlord. This means that it is likely that the Net
Present Value of HCHP's remaining lease payments are likely to become an
issue. HCHP should bear in mind that the landlord may secretly be glad to
be able to turn over $14 a square foot space to a higher-paying tenant.
Commit to a 12-Month Approvals Effort: HCHP should begin the approvals
process for Option C. At a minimum, this should include multiple series
of informal meetings with 1) the BRA; 2) any Citizens Advisory Committee
which the BRA may assemble to review the project; 3) the State Office of
Environmental Affairs which will define the scope of the required
Environmental Impact Report; 4) the Boston Preservation Alliance; 5) the
Massachusetts Historical Commission; 6) the Boston Society of Architects;
and 7) any influential spokespersons on downtown development issues.
So far, HCHP has had only one meeting with the BRA, and that was six
months ago. There have been no meetings with any of these other groups,
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even to informally solicit reactions. This is a dangerously slender
thread on which to hang the likelihood of getting approvals for this
project, particularly when the BRA itself is presently in the process of
taking a more restrictive stance on downtown development. Nonetheless,
Option C has many things going for it: 1) it promises to contribute more
to the City's coffers than either of its lesser-scale alternatives; 2) it
produces minimal environmental impacts, ie. wind, shadow, air quality,
traffic, etc.; 3) it promises to preserve one of the most precious
historic buildings in the historic Custom House District; 4) it promises
to replace a dilapidated parking structure, one of the District's worst
eyesores; and 5) conceptually, combining the two parcels is the strongest
urban design solution. HCHP should begin to build support for the project
as soon as possible.
Solicit Proposals for Joint Venture Deals: These need not be only for
Option C. Other properties should be considered. HCHP should draw up a
short-list of developers who have related experience, sensitivity to local
politics and an interest in working with HCHP, and send each a Request for
Proposal. HCHP should ask the developers both to state on what terms they
would offer to be involved in the development of Option C, and to present
alternative proposals for developments on other downtown sites.
Background information should include a brief outline of the deal
structure for HCHP's new Plan Management Offices, and a list of HCHP's
general goals as they pertain to real estate. By opening its project to
the consideration of numerous experts, HCHP may benefit from the kind of
creativity which only competition can inspire.
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Direct Design Refinements to Improve the Project Economics and Answer
Approvals Concerns: HCHP should direct its architect to try and resolve
the least satisfactory aspects of Option C as soon as possible. To date,
the architect has received no specific feedback about any of the three
options. The architect has spent further hours investigating alternative
facade treatments for Option C, when this time might better have been
spent resolving various problems inherent in the plans. Option C has an
HCHP lobby which gets too little exposure and is incorrectly oriented for
downtown foot traffic; two levels of underground parking which do not
work; and no pedestrian easement reflecting where Well Street once ran, a
feature which the BRA insists is necessary.
Monitor Membership Growth: The capacity of the present downtown center is
roughly 30,000 members. If membership reaches and exceeds that capacity,
there will be additional pressure and justification for the move to
another facility, particularly one which can accommodate physical
expansion. It will be important for HCHP to monitor the membership growth
rate over the next year. Downtown enrollment is presently 17,000 members,
and growing at the rate of 1,000 members per month -- greater growth than
any HCHP has experienced at any of its other Health Centers.\l If
membership growth continues at this rate, the new Center should be larger
than 50,000 square feet, or HCHP should plan to build two Centers. If
downtown enrollment falls off, the new Center may be able to be smaller
than 50,000 square feet. This has critical implications for both the
design of the new project and its financing. Low-cost HEFA bonds are
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available only for the square footage actually occupied by HCHP, so the
smaller the Health Center, the less economically viable the project.
Consider Other Investment Alternatives While it is clear that Option C
is likely to provide a lower occupancy cost than staying in a leased
facility, it is not clear that Option C offers a more favorable
risk/reward trade-off than many other investment options. HCHP should
seriously consider investment alternatives other than real estate. Other
investments may be able to provide sooner positive cash flow, higher
returns, and greater liquidity. In the precarious position of having its
utilization reserves fully depleted every year, HCHP should strive for
these three features in whatever investment it decides to make.
It is not enough that Option C compare favorably with Options A and B, or
even that it compare favorably with other deals on other sites. Instead,
Option C must be judged among the wide range of other types of investments
which HCHP could choose to make.
As a developer, HCHP is both motivated and constrained its fiduciary
responsibility to 180,000 members. While it has successfully developed
property for its own use, has the reasonable expectation of deriving the
maximum financial benefit from owning property, and is actively seeking to
diversify its business -- HCHP must not undertake speculative office
development lightly. HCHP should make every effort to mitigate the risks,
and then only for a project which promises greater returns than any other
possible investment.
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EXHIBITS 2 & 3
AREA TAKE-OFFS & ASSUMED RENT RATES Exhibit 2
Option A Option B Option C
Program Areas (6SF):
HCHP
HCHP Lobby
Office
Office Lobby
Office Services
Retail
Garage
Mechanical
Total 6SF
Total 6SF less Garage
Rentable Square Feet
HCHP (incl. Lobby)
Office (excl. Lobby)
Retail
Parking Spaces
Total RSF
(RSF):
(1)
Percent RSF/6SF
Ratio Parking/Office
Assumed Rental Rates:
HCHP (incl. Lobby) (2)
Office (excl. Lobby)
Retail
Parking (per month)
55900
1936
6536
64372
64372
57836
4
57836
89.8%
53089
3730
44676
820
4224
1362
18008
10462
56279
2312
127484
3950
16989
11298
44248
15782
NOTES
General Note:
Costs & rents are in 1985
dollars.
136371 278342
118363
56819
48900
1362
50
107081
90.5%
234094
58591
144473
11298
102
214362
91.6%
(1) Assume Office Services is
rentable area.
1/1000 1.4/1000
$20
$150
$30
$35$40
$150
$30
$35
$40
$150
(2) Assume HCHP's lease is at
$5 less than office rate.
Assume Option A rates are
$10 lower because 66.9% of
bldg is renovated space.
ESTIMATED PROJECT COSTS Exhibit 3
Option A Option 8 Option C
Gross Square Feet:
New Space
Existing Space
Below-Grade Garage
Total 6SF
Percent New Space
Percent Renovated Space
Estimated Cost/6SF
Hard Costs
Soft Costs (Add 25%)
Lease-Up Deficit (1)
Land
Total Project Cost
21304
43068
0
64372
33.1%
66.9%
112063
6300
18000
136363
95.4%
4.6%
$121.70 $117.27
$7,834,072 $15,991,289
1,958,518 3,997,822
0 1,616,392
4,836,898 4,836,898
227794
6300
44248
278342
NOTES
General Note:
Costs & rents are in 1985
dollars.
97.7%
2.3%
$89.26
$24,844,807
6,211,202
5,041,882
9,673,796 (2)
$14,629,489 $26,442,402 $45,771,687
(1) Assume a lease-up period
of 2-1/2 years for
Options 8 & C.
(2) Assume Option C Land Cost
is double that of either
Option A or B.
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EXHIBIT 4
DEVELOPMENT MAGNITUDE
Proiect
99 State Street
Rowes/Fosters Wharf
International Place
150 Federal Street
101 Federal Street
One Franklin Place
99 Summer Street
Arlington/Hadassah
500 Boylston Street
TOTALS
___________________________________________________ 
L
Size
TotalSA rea
(OOOs SF)
600
665
1,657
510
505
416
264
486
1,379
6,482
Rentable Area Floor/
(000s SF) Area
Office Retail Ratio1
510
340
1,471
475
469
340
239
112
-1,200
50
13
70
10
15
46-
10
45
100
12.25
4.00
14.37
13.71
16. W
12.50
12.60
9.56
9.50
Height
Stories
22
16
46
26
28
20
20
12
25
Feet
265
182
600
348
382
273
282
130
330
5,156 359
NOTES
1. Total above-grade floor space divided by site area.
2. Total cost of the project as estimated by the developer.
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A
Cost
For Total.
Development
(0OOs)
$ 90,000
150,000
414,000
90,000
101,000
80,000
39,600
80,000
289,000
$1,333,600
EXHIBITS 5 & 6
POTENTIAL VALUE CREATION Exhibit 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option A Option B Option C
Sross Income:
HCHP (1)
Office
Retail
Parking
Total 6ross Income
Less 15% Vacancy: (2)
(Office & Retail)
Less Operating Expenses:
($/WS above grade,$4/69F garage)
NOI
ROA (NOI/Project Cost)
NOI Capped @ 8% (3)
NOI Capped @ 9%
NOI Capped @ 10%
Total Project Cost
Min. Value Creation
Max. Value Creation
$1,445,900
0
0
7,200
----------
$1,453,100
(450,604)
$1,988,665
1,711,500
54,480
90,000
$2,050,685
5,056,555
451,920
183,600
$3,844,645 $7,742,760
NOTES
(1) Assume sale of bldg would
cause HCHP's rent to rise
to market office rates --
$25/sf in Option A, and
$35/sf in B & C.
0 (256,725) (758,483) (2) Anticipated 1989
structural vacancy level.
$1,002,496 $2,687,347 $5,168,627
6.85%
$12,531,200
$11,138,844
$10,024,960
10.16%
$33,591,838
$29,859,411
$26,873,470
1L291
$64,607,834
$57,429, 186
$51,686,268
(3) Assume cap rate is btwn
8% and 10% depending on
strength of b1dg leases.
$14,629,489 $26,442,402 $45,771,687
($4,604,529) $431,068 $5,914,581
($2,098,289) $7,149,436 $18,836,148
-------------------------------------------------------------
1987 FINANCIN6 ASSUMPTIONS Exhibit 6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Escalated Project Costs:
Hard Cost
Soft Cost
Lease-Up Deficit (1)
Total Equity and Debt
Equity Requirement:
20% Hard & Soft Costs
20% Lease-Up Deficit
Total Cash Required
Total Equity
(incl Land Cost)
Debt Required:
80% Hard & Soft Costs
80% Lease-Up Deficit
Total Debt Required
Option A Option B Option C
$8,637,065 $17,631,430 $27,391,400
2,159,266 4,407,858 6,847,850
0 1,929,734 6,019,259
$10,796,331 $23,969,022 $40,258,509
$2,159,266 $4,407,858 $6,847,850
0 385,947 1,203,852
$2,159,266
NOTES
(1) Assume office & retail
space takes 2-1/2 years
to lease, and that loss
of rent equals one full
year's office & retail
revenues 0 1988 rates.
$4,793,804 $8,051,702
$6,996,164 $9,630,702 $17,725,498
$8,637,065 $17,631,430
0 1,543,787
$8,637,065 $19,175,218
$27,391,400
4,815,407
$32,206,807
Percentage of Hard & Soft
Costs Attributable to
HCHP-Occupied Space (2)
HEFA Bond Issue Amt
(Assumed 1 8%)
Market-Rate Loan Amt (3)
(Assumed @ 14%)
100% 52%
------- ----- ------
$8,637,065 $9,168,344 $7,121,764
0 $10,006,874 $25,085,043
-68-
1 (2) HCHP occupies 71,054 out
of 136,371 8SF in Option B
and 73,653 out of 278,342
6SF in Option C.
(3) Includes 100% of Lease-Up
Deficit.
(900,573) (1,815,650)
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EXHIBIT 7A
HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER Exhibit 7A
Option A
-- - - - - - - - - - - - -- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10-YEAR CASH FLOW PROJECTION
YEAR 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
ACTIVITY Bround Design/ Demol/ Constr/ Stblzd
Lease Apprvls Constr Move-in Yr
ASSUMPTIONS (1)---- ------ ---- ---- -- ---- -- - -
Construction Cost (per 8SF)
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF)
Office Rental Rate (per RSF)
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF)
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF)
Operating Expenses
Operating Expenses
(per 6SF Bldg)(per SSF Barage)
$121.70 $127.79 $134.17 $140.88 $147.93 $155.32 $163.09 $171.24 $179.81 $188.80 $198.24 $208.15 $218.56
$20.00$25.00
$30.00
$150.00
$7.00
$4.00
$20.60
$25.75
$30.90
$157.50
$7.35
$4.20
$21.22
$26.52
$31.83
$165.38
$7.72
$4.41
Building Revenues (2)
Parking Revenues
BROSS EVENUES
Less: Vacancy @ 0% (3)
$21.85
$27.32
$32.78$173.64
$8.10$4.63
$22.51
$28.14
$33.77
$182.33
$8.51
$4.86
631,990 1,263,979
4,167 81752
636,157 1,272,731
0 0
$23.19
$28.98
$34.78
$191.44
$8.93
$5.11
1,263,979
9,189
1,273,168
0
$23.88
$29.85
$35.82
$201.01
$9.38
$5.36
1,263,979
9,649
1,273,628
0
$24.60
$30.75
$36.90
$211.07
$25.34
$31.67
$38.00
$221.62
$9.85 $10.34$5.63 $5.91
1,263,979
10,131
1,274,110
0
1,263,979
10,638
1,274,617
0
$26.10
$32.62
$39.14
$232.70
$10.86
$6.21
1,263,979
11,170
1,275,149
0
$26.88
$33.60
$40.32
$244.33
$11.40
$6.52
1,263,979
11,728
1,275,707
0
$27.68
$34.61
$41.53
$256.55
$11.97
$6.84
1,263,979
12,314
1,276, 294
0
$28.52
$35.64
$42.77
$269.38
$12.57
$7.18
1,263,979
12,930
1,276,909
0.
(1) Escalating at 51 a Year:
Construction Costs
Operatin Expenses
Parking Rental Rates
Escalating at 31 a Year:
Building Rental Rates
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP
Office
Retail
Parking
57,836
0
0
4
NET REVENUES (GROSS OPER INCOME)
Less: Operating Expenses (Bldg)
Less: Operating Expenses (Garage)
636,157(521,630)
0
1,272,731(547,712)
0
1,273,168 1,273,628 1 274,110
(580,575) (615,409) 1652,334)
0 0 0
1,274,617(691,474)
0
1,275,149(732,962)
0
1 275,707
1776,940)
0
1 276,294
1823,556)
0
1,276,909(872,970)
0
NET OPERATING INCOME (FREE & CLEAR) 114,527 725,019 692,594 658,219 621,777 583,143 542,187 498,767 452,737 403,940
Less: Bround Rent (375,000) (375,000) (410,000) (425,000) (425,000) (425,000) (486,200) (486,200) (486,200) (556,213) (556,213) (556,213) (636,307)
Less: Construction Loan Int @ 14% (4) (604,595) (483,676)
Less: Permanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 rs (5) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208) (767,208)
Market-Rate Loan 17, 30 rs (6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Debt Coverage Ratio (DS/NOI less BR) 0.61 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.29
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW (375,000) (375,000) (1,014,595) (794,149) (467,189) (499,615) (595,190) (631,632) (670,265) (781,235) (824,654) (870,684) (999,576)
Plus: Amortization of Debt 86 444 93,359 100 828 108,894 117,606 127,014 137,175 148,149 160,001
Less: Depreciation (579,397) (579:397) (579,397) (579,397) (579,397) (579,397) (579,397) (579397) (579,397)
and Ca italized Expenses
Taxable ncome (Loss) (375,000) (375,000) (1,014,595) (1,373,546) (960,143) (985,653) (1,073,759) (1,102,135) (1,132,056) (1,233,618) (1,266,876) (1,301,932) (1,418,972)
Tax Shelter Benefit e (35% 131,250 131,250 355,108 480,741 336,050 344,978 375,816 385,747 396,220 431,766 443,407 455,676 496,640
25% Investment Tax Credit (66.9%)1,805,686
Cash Equity Required (2,159,266)
---------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW (243,750) (243,750) (659,486) (2,472,674) 1,674,547 (154,636) (219,374) (245,885) (274,045) (349,468) (381,247) (415,008) (502,936)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @ 10% (2,799,164)
IRR 
-174.64%
ROA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 4.64% 4.43% 4.217 3.98% 3.73% 3.47% 3.19% 2.901 2.581
ROE or 'Cash on Cash' (BTCF/Equity) 
-21.64% -23.14% -27.56% -29.257 -31.04% -36.187 -38.19% -40.32% -46.29%
~~~~~~~~--- -- -- -- -  - -- ----- ----------- - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE
Hard Costs Less 25Z ITC
Soft Costs Less 25% ITC
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
Dep. Life
18
10
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584
179,813 179, 813 179,813 179,813 179,813 179, 813
579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397
1994
399,584
179,813
579,397
1995 1996 1997
399,584 399,584 399,584
179,813 179, 813 179,813
579,397 579,~97 579,397
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$8,637,065
AOB:1-12 mos 50%
13-18 nos 80%
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Amount:
$8,637,065
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:$0
(7) Total 8SF: 64,372
Project Costs:
Hard 8,637,065
Soft 2,159,266
Lease-Up Def 0
TPC w/o Land 10,796,331
TPC w/Land 15,633,229
Equity Req: 2,159,266
Average RDA
Average ROE
3.68%
-32.627
Deprec Not Deprec
Taken Taken
3,196,674 5,793,971
(0)
3,196,674
NOTES
(3) Assume VacancY for
Option A is 0 .
------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------
--------------------------------------
------- -------
EXHIBIT 7B
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HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER Exhibit 78
Option B
----- ---- ---- - - - -- ---- ----- Option-
10-YEAR CASH FLOW PROJECTION
YEAR 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997ACTIVITY Ground Design/ Demol/ Constr/ Stblzd TurningLease Apprvls Constr Move-in Yr YrASSUMPTIONS (1) ----- ----- ---- -- ----- -
Construction Cost (per SSF)
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF)
Office Rental Rate (per RSF)
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF)
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF)
Operating Expenses
Operating Expenses
(per 6SF Bldg)
(per 6SF Garage)
$117.27 $123.13 $129.29 $135.75 $142.54 $149.67 $15715 $165.01 $173.26 $181.92 $191.02 $200.57 $210.60
$30.00
$35.00
$40.00
$150.00
$7.00$4.00
$30.90
$36.05
$41.20
$157.50
$7.35
$4.20
$31.83
$37. 13
$42.44
$165.38
$7.72
$4.41
$32.78
$38.25
$43.71
$173.64
$8.10$4.63
$33.77
$39.39
$45.02
$182.33
$8.51$4.86
$34.78
$40.57$46.37
$191.44
$8.93
$5.11
$35.82
$41.79
$47.76
$201.01
$9.38
$5.36
$36.90
$43.05
$49.19
$211.07
$38.00
$44.34
$50.67
$221.62
$9.85 $10.34
$5.63 $5.91
$39.14
$45.67
$52.19
$232.70
$10.86
$6.21
$40.32
$47.04
$53.76
$244.33
$11.40
$6.52
$41.53
$48.45
$55.37
$256.55
$11.97
$6.84
$42.77
$49.90
$57.03
$269.38
$12.57
$7.18
(1) Escalating at 5% a Year:
Construction Costs
Operating Expenses
Parking Rental Rates
Escalating at 37 a Year:
Building Rental Rates
Building Revenues (2) 1,896,182 3,792,364 3,792,364 3,792,364 3,792,364 4,396,389 4,396,389 4,396,389 4,396,389 4,396,389
Parking Revenues 52,093 109,396 114,865 120,609 126,639 132,971 139,620 146,601 153,931 161,627GROSS REVENUES 1,948,275 3 901,759 3,907,229 3 912,972 3,919,003 4,529,360 4 536,008 4 542,989 4,550,319 4 558,016Less: Vacancy @ 157 (3) (144,730) 1289,460) (289:460) 1289,460) (289,460) (335,564) 1335,564) 1335,564) (335,564) 1335,564)
NET REVENUES (GROSS OPER INCOME) 1 803,545 3,612,299 3,617,769 3,623,512 3,629,543 4,193,796 4,200,445 4,207,426 4,214,756 4,222,452Less: Operating Expenses (Bldg) 1959,140) (1,007,097) (1,057,452) (1,110,324) (1,165,840) (1 224,132) (1 285,339) (1,349,606) (1 417,086) (1,487,941)Less: Operating Expenses (Garage) (83,386) (87,555) (91,933) (96,530) (101,356) 1106,424) 1111,745) (117,333) 1123,199) (129,359)
NET OPERATING INCOME (FREE & CLEAR) 761,019 2 517,647 2 468,384 2 416,658 2 362,346 2,863,240 2,803,361 2 740,487 2,674,470 2,605,153Less: Ground Rent (375,000) (375,000) (410,000) (425,000) 1425,000) 1425,000) 1486,200) 486,200) (486,200) (556,213) 1556,213) (556,213) (636,307)Less: Construction Loan Int @ 14Z (4) (1,342,265) (1,073,812)
Less: Permanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 yrs (5) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400) (814,400)Market-Rate Loan @ 14%, 30 yrs (6) (1,429 010) (1,429,010) (1,429,010) (1,429 010) (1,429 010) (1,429,010) (1,429,010) (1,429010) (1,429 010)Debt Coverage Ratio (DS/NOI less 6R) 6.94 0.93 0.89 6.87 1.05 1.00 6.98 6.96 6.90
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW (375,000) (375,000) (1,752,265) (737,793) (150,763) (200,026) (312,952) (367,264) 133,630
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plus: Amortiz of HEFA Bonds
Plus: Aaortization of Loan
Less: Depreciation
and Capitalized Expenses
Taxable Income (Loss)
Tax Shelter Benefit @ 35%
251 Investment Tax Credit (4.6%)
Cash Equity Required
80,932
28,048
(1,596,950) (1,596,950)
(375,000) (375,000) (1,752,265) (2,334,743)
131,250 131,250 613,293 817,160
(4,793,804)
(1,638,732)
573,556
253,452
87,407
31,974
(1,596,950)
94,400
36,451(1,596,950)
101,952
41,554
(1,596,950)
110,108
47,371
(1,596,950)
3,738 (59,136) (125,153) (274,564)
118,916
54,003
(1,596,950)
128,430
61,564
(1,596,950)
138,704
70,183
(1,596,950)
149,800
80,008
(1,596,950)
(1,677 594) (1,779,050) (1,820,708) (1,305,841) (1,420,293) (1,466,091) (1,513,215) (1,641,706)
587,158 622,668 637,:248 457,044 497,103 513,132 529,625 574,597
-------------------------------------------------------------
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW (243,750) (243,750) (1,138,972) (4,714,438) 676,245 387,132 309,716 269,984
---------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------- 
-- - -----
590,674 500,840 453,994 404,473 300,033
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @R10R (3,032,674)
IRR -6.627
ROA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 8.74% 8.571 8.39% 8.20% 9.94% 9.73% 9.51% 9.287. 9.04%
ROE or 'Cash on Cash' (BTCF/Equity) 
-3.14% -4.17% -6.537 -7.66% 2.79% 0.087. -1.237. -2.61% -5.73%
------ ------- --- ----- -- --- -- --- -- -- ---------- - - - - -
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP
Office
Retail
Parking
(3) Assume
Office
Option
56,819
48,900
1,362
50
Vacancy for
& Retail in
B is 151.
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$19,175,218
AOB:1-12 nos 7  501
13-18 mos 80%
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Aount:
$9,168,344
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:
$10,006,874
(7) Total 6SF:
Project Costs
Hard
Soft
Lease-Up Def
TPC w/o Land
TPC w/Land
136,371
s:
17,631,430
4,407,858
1,929,734
23,969,022
28,805,920
Equity Req: 4,793,804
Average ROA
Average ROE
9.05%
-3.13%
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE
Hard Costs Less 25Z ITC
Soft Costs Less 25. ITC
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
Dep. Life
18
10
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
968,259 968,259
628,690 628,690
1990
968,259
628, 690
1991
968,259
628;690
-,596,950-1,56,950-1,596,5-- 1,596,9--
1,596,950 11596,950 l1,596,950 1,596,950
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
968,259 968,259 968,259 968,259 968,259 968,259
628,690 628,690 628,690 628,690 628,690 628,690
Deprec Not Deprec
Taken Taken
7,746,075 15,969,495(0)
1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 19690,950
NOTES
,596,950 7,746,075
EXHIBIT 7C
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HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER Exhibit 7C
Option C
10-YEAR CASH FLOW PROJECTION
YEAR 0
1985
0
1986
0
1987
19
19988
2
1989
3
1990
4
1991
5
1992
6
1993 1994
7 8B
1995
9
1996
10
1997
ACTIVITY Ground Design/ Demol/ Constr/ Stblzd Turning
Lease Apprvls Constr Move-in Yr Yr
ASSUMPTIONS (1) ---- -------- ---- --- ----- -- -----
Construction Cost (per 6SF) $89.26 $93.72 $98.41 $103.33 $108.50 $113.92 $119.62 $125.60 $131.88 $138.47 $145.40 $152.66 $160.30
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF) $30.00 $30.90 $31.83 $32.78 $33.77 $34.78 $35.82 $36.90 $38.00 $39.14 $40.32 $41.53 $42.77
Office Rental Rate (per RSF) $35.00 $36.05 $37.13 $38.25 $39.39 $40.57 $41,79 $43.05 $44.34 $45.67 $47.04 $48.45 $49.90
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF) $40.00 $41.20 $42.44 $43.71 $45.02 $46.37 $47.76 $49.19 $50.67 $52.19 $53.76 $55.37 $57.03
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF) $150.00 $157.50 $165.38 $173.64 $182.33 $191.44 $201.01 $211.07 $221.62 $232.70 $244.33 $256.55 $269.38
Operating Expenses (per 6SF Bldg) $7.00 $7.35 $7.72 $8.10 $8.51 $8.93 $9.38 $9.85 $10.34 $10.86 $11.40 $11.97 $12.57
Operating Expenses (per GSF Garage) $4.00 $4.20 $4.41 $4.63 $4.86 $5.11 $5.36 $5.63 $5.91 $6.21 $6.52 $6.84 $7.18
Building Revenues (2) 3,969,989 7,939,978 7,939,978 7,939,978 7,939,978 9,204,611 9,204,611 9,204,611 9,204,611 9,204,611
Parking Revenues 106,270 223,167 234,325 246,042 258,344 271,261 284,824 299,065 314,018 329,719
GROSS REVENUES 4,076,259 8 163,145 8,174,304 8,186,020 8,198,322 9,475,872 9,489,435 9,503,676 9,518,629 9,534,330
Less: Vacancy @ 15% (3) (451,444) 1902,889) (902,889) (902,889) (902,889) (1,046,696) (1,046,696) (1,046,696) (1,046,696) (1,046,696)
NET REVENUES (GROSS OPER INCOME) 3,624,815 7,260,256 7,271,415 7,283,131 7,295,433 8,429,176 8,442,739 8,456,980 8,471,934 8,487,635
Less: Operating Expenses (Bldg) (1,896,951) (1,991,799) (2,091,389) (2,195,958) (2,305,756) (2,421,044) (2,542,096) (2,669,201) (2 802,661) (2,942,794)
Less: Operating Expenses (Garage) (204,890) (215,135) (225,892) (237,186) (249,046) 1261,498) 1274,573) 1288,301) 1302,716) 13171,852)
NET OPERATING INCOME (FREE & CLEAR) 1,522,973 5,053,323 4,954,134 4,849,986 4,740,631 5,746,634 5,626,070 5499,478 5,366,556 5,226,988
Less: Ground Rent (375,000) (375,000) (410,000) 1425,000) 1425,000) 1425,000) 1486,200) 1486,200) (486,200) (556,213) 1556,213) 5, 1 (636,307)
Less: Construction Loan Int @ 147. (4) (2,254,476) (1,803,581)
Less: Persanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 yr s (5)
Market-Rate Loan z 11, 30 yrs (6)
Debt Coverage Ratio (OS/NOI less 6R)
(632,608) (632,608) (632,608) (632,608) (632,608) (632,608) (632,608) (632,608) (632,608)(3,582,214) (3,582,214) (3,582,214) (3,582 214) (3,582 214) (3,582,214) (3,582,214) (3,582,214) (3,582,214)
1.09 1.07 1.03 .01 1 .22 1.18 1.15 1.12 1.08
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW (375,000) (375,000) (2,664,476) (705,608) 413,500 314,312 148,964 39,609 1,045,612 855,035 728,443 595,521 375,859
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plus: Amortiz of HEFA Bonds 62,867 67,896 73,328 79,194 85,530 92,372 99,762 107,743 116,362
Plus: Aeortization of Loan 70,308 80,151 91,372 104,164 118,747 135,372 154,324 175,929 200,559
Less: Depreciation (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906) (2,791,906)
and Capitalized Expenses
Taxable Income (Loss) (375,000) (375,000) (2,664,476) (3,497,515) (2,245,231) (2,329,547) (2,478,242) (2,568,939) (1,542,017) (1,709,127) (1,809,378) (1,912,714) (2,099,127)
Tax Shelter Benefit @ 35Z 131,250 131,250 932,567 1,224,130 785,831 815,342 867,385 899,129 539,706 598,195 633,282 669,450 734,694
25Z Investment Tax Credit (4.6Z) 256,794
Cash Equity Required (8,051,702)
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW -(243,750) (243,750) (1,731,910) (7,533,180) 1,456,126 1,129,654 1,016,349 938,738 1,585,318 1,453,230 1,361,725 1,264,971 1,110,553
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
------------------------------------------------------------------
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @ 10% (2,126 960)
IRR .88%
ROA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 10.12% 9.92% 9.717 9.49% 11.51% 11.27% 11.011 10.75% 10.47%
ROE or 'Cash on Cash' (BTCF/Equity) 5.14% 3.90% 1.85% 0.497. 12.99% 10.627. 9.057. 7.40% 4.67%
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE Dep. Life 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Hard Costs Less 25% ITC 18 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331
Soft Costs Less 25% ITC 10 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906
NOTES
(1) Escalating at 57 a Year:
Construction Costs
Operating Expenses
Parking Rental Rates
Escalating at 31 a Year:
Building Rental Rates
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP 58,591
Office 144,473
Retail 11,298
Parking 102
(3) Assume Vacancy for
Office & Retail in
Option B is 151.
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$32,206,807
AOB:1-12 mos 50%
13-18 mos 80%
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Amount:
$7,121,764
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:$25,085,043
(7) Total 6SF: 278,342
Project Costs:
Hard 27,391,400
Soft 6,847;850
Lease-Up Def 6,019,259
TPC w/o Land 40,258,509
TPC w/Land 49,932,305
Equity Req: 8,051,702
Average ROA
Average ROE
Deprec Not
Taken
12,082,651
0
12,082,651
10.47%
6.23%
Deprec
Taken
27,919,064
--------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT 8
16-May-84
HCHP
N.P.V. ANALYSIS
LAND RENT & PURCHASE
ASSUMPTIONS: DISCOUNT RATE:
C.P.I.:
I OF C.P.I. USED TO ESCALATE:
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS:
CPI 30 YRS 60 YRS
0.0375
0.06
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.20
+K40
3,906,149
4,528,277
5,243,184
5,672,983
6,160,596
6,714,574
7,344,751
8,880,629
9,814,264
10,880, 494
16,911,305
+K70
3,991,690
4,797,535
5,871,200
6,603,663
7,521,773
8,685,553
10,176,693
14,628,541
17,951,846
22, 365, 277
61,504,396
90 YRS
YEAR ESCALATOR
+K100
3,998,620
4,834,218
6,005,997
6,853,758
7,978,952
9,511,607
11,655,326
19,264,216
26,089,428
36,583,822
189,285,480
FURTHER ASSUMPTIONS, TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
----------------------------------------
THERE IS A CAP TO THE MAXIMUM ESCALATION
OF RENT IN ANY ONE YEAR AMOUNTING TO 12 X,
WHICH IS EQUAL TO 80 1 OF A C.P.I. OF 15 1.
THUS, IN THE TABLE ABOVE, THE VALUES SHOWN
NEXT TO ".15' WOULD OCCUR IF THE C.P.I
WERE 15% OR MORE FOR EVERY YEAR UP TO THE
TIME OF PURCHASE. THE VALUES FOR HIGHER
C.P.I.'S ARE SHOWN FOR INFO ONLY.
NO ANNUAL INCREASE IN THE ESCALATOR SHALL
BE LESS THAN 3% (801 OF A C.P.I. INCREASE
OF 3.75% ).
DUPONT MAY PUT THE PROPERTY TO HCHP ANY TIME
ON ONE YEAR'S NOTICE, AT tEN TIMES THE THEN
CURRENT RENT, BUT NOT LESS THAN $4,900,000.
RENT COST AS SHOWN IS $375,000 FOR THE FIRST
TWO YEARS, LESS AN ASSUMED NET RENTAL INCOME
OF $260,000 PER YEAR, AND $410,000 IN THE
THIRD YEAR, LESS THE SAME AMOUNT OF $260,000.
THE RENT COST AS SHOWN FOR YEARS FOUR, FIVE
AND SIX IS $425,000. ZERO RENTAL INCOME IS
ASSUMED AFTER THE THIRD YEAR.
RENT IS PAYABLE AT THE START OF EACH YEAR AS
INDICATED.
THE PURCHASE PRICE IS ASSUMED TO BE PAID AT
THE END OF THE YEAR INDICATED.
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
1.00000
1.04800
1.09830
1.15102
1.20627
1.26417
1.32485
1. 38845
1. 45509
1.52494
1.59813
1.67484
1.75524
1.83949
1.92778
2.02032
2.11729
2.21892
2.32543
2.43705
2.55403
2.67662
2.80510
2.93974
3.08085
3.22873
3.38371
3.54613
3.71634
3.89473
4.08168
4.27760
4.48292
4. 69810
4.92361
5.15994
5.40762
5.66719
5.93921
6.22429
6.52306
6.83617
7.16430
RENT
115,000
115,000
150,000
425,000
425,000
425,000
489,185
489,185
489,185
563, 063
563,063
563,063
648,098
648,098
648,098
745,975
745,975
745,975
858,634
858,634
858,634
988,307
988,307
988,307
1,137,564
1,137,564
1,137,564
1,309,362
1,309,362
1,309,362
1,507,105
1,507,105
1,507,105
1,734,712
1,734,712
1,734,712
1,996,693
1,996,693
1,996,693
2,298,239
2,298,239
2,298,239
2,645,324
2,645,324
2,645,324
3,044,828
PRICE
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
4,900,000
5,630,625
5,630,625
5,630,625
6,480,977
6,480,977
6,480,977
7,459,751
7,459,751
7,459,751
8,586,342
8,586,342
8,586,342
9,883,073
9,883,073
9,883,073
11,375,641
11,375,641
11,375,641
13,093,619
13,093,619
13,093,619
15,071,052
15,071,052
15,071,052
17,347,121
17,347,121
17,347,121
19,966,928
19,966,928
19,966,928
22,982,386
22,982,386
22,982,386
26,453,245
26,453,245
26,453,245
30,448,283
N.P.V. OF
N.P.V. OF RENT AND
PRICE PRICE
4,375,000
3,906,250
3,487,723
3,114,039
2,780,392
2,482,492
2,216,511
1,979,028
1,766,989
1,812,911
1,618,670
1,445,241
1,485,273
1,326,136
1,184,050
1,216,847
1,086,470
970,063
996,932
890,118
794,748
816,762
729,252
651,118
669,153
597,458
533, 445
548,220
489,482
437,038
449,143
401,021
358,054
367,972
328,546
293,345
301,470
269,170
240,330
246,987
220,524
196,897
202,350
180, 670
161,312
165,781
4,490,000
4,123,929
3,824,981
3,753,803
3,690,251
3,633,508
3,615,363
3,599,162
3,584,697
3,833,664
3,820,715
3,909,153
4,015,535
4,004,926
3,995,453
4,164,537
4,155,845
4,148,085
4,286,611
4,279,490
4,273,132
4,386,623
4,380,789
4,375,580
4,468,560
4,463,780
4,459,513
4,535, 689
4,531,773
4,528,277
4,590,686
4,587,478
4,584, 614
4,635,744
4,633,116
4,630,769
4,672,659
4,670,506
4,668,583
4,702,903
4,701,138
4,699,563
4,727,680
4,726,235
4,724,944
4,747,980
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12.001
6.001
80.00!
--------------------------------- - -- - -
DISCOUNTED PRESENT VALUES ARE AS OF THE
8ESINNING OF "1984'.
EXHIBIT 8
2030
2031
2032
2033
2034
2035
2036
2037
2038
2039
2040
2041
2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068
2069
2070
2071
2072
2073
2074
2075
2076
2077
2078
2079
2080
2081
2082
7.50819
7.86858
8.24627
8.64209
9.05691
9. 49165
9.94725
10.42471
10.92510
11.44950
11.99908
12.57504
13.17864
13.81121
14.47415
15.16891
15.89702
16.66008
17.45976
18.29783
19.17612
20.09658
21.06121
22.07215
23.13161
24. 24193
25.40554
26.62501
27.90301
29.24236
30.64599
32. 11700
33. 65861
35.27423
36.96739
38.74182
40.60143
42.55030
44.59271
46.73316
48.97635
51.32722
53.79093
56.37289
59.07879
61.91457
64.88647
68.00102
71.26507
74.69579
78.27071
82.02771
85.96504
3,044,828
3,044,828
3,504,666
3,504,666
3,504,666
4,033,950
4,033,950
4,033,950
4,643,167
4,643,167
4,643,167
5,344,391
5,344,391
5,344,391
6,151,514
6,151,514
6,151,514
7,080,532
7,080,532
7,080,532
8,149,852
8,149,852
8,149,852
9,380,664
9,380,664
9,380,664
10,797,356
10,797,356
10,797,356
12,428,001
12,428,001
12,428,001
14, 304,910
14,304,910
14,304,910
16,465,275
16,465,275
16,465,275
18,951,903
18,951,903
18,951,903
21,814,068
21,814,068
21,814,068
25,108,486
25,108,486
25,108,486
28,900,434
28,900,434
28,900,434
33,265,053
33,265,053
33,265,053
30,448,283
30,448,283
35,046,661
35,046,661
35,046,661
40,339,499
40,339,499
40,339,499
46,431,674
46,431,674
46,431,674
53,443,906
53,443,906
53,443,906
61,515,143
61,515,143
61,515,143
70,905,320
70,805,320
70,805,320
81,498,523
81,498,523
81,498,523
93,806,641
93,806,641
93,806,641
107,973,563
107,973,563
107,973,563
124,280,010
124,280,010
124,280,010
143,049, 100
143,049,100
143,049,100
164,652,745
164,652,745
164, 652,745
189,519,030
189,519,030
189,519,030
218,140,685
218,140,685
218,140,685
251,084,857
251,084,857
251,084,857
289,004,342
289,004,342
289,004,342
332,650,527
332,650,527
332,650,527
148,018
132,159
135,820
121,268
108,275
111,274
99,352
88,707
91,164
81,396
72,675
74,688
66,696
59,541
61,190
54,634
48,781
50,132
44,760
39,965
41,072
36,671
32,742
33,649
30,044
26,825
27,568
24,614
21,977
22,586
20,166
18,005
18,504
16,521
14,751
15,160
13,535
12,085
12,420
11,089
9,901
10,175
9,085
8,112
8,336
7,443
6,646
6,830
6,098
5,445
5,596
4,996
4,461
4,746,796
4,745,739
4,764,611
4,763,641
4,762,775
4,778,236
4,777,442
4,776,732
4,789,399
4,788,748
4,788,167
4,798,545
4,798,011
4,797,535
4,806,038
4,805,601
4,805,210
4,812,176
4,811,818
4,811,498
4,817,205
4,816,912
4,816,650
4,821,326
4,821,085
4,820,871
4,824,701
4,824,504
4,824,329
4,827,467
4,827,306
4,827,162
4,829,733
4,829,601
4,829,483
4,831,589
4,831,481
4,831,384
4,833,110
4,833,021
4,832,942
4,834,356
4,834,283
4,834,218
4,935,377
4,835,317
4,835,264
4,836,213
4,836,164
4,136,121
4,836,898
4,836,858
4,836,822
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EXHIBIT 9
TABLE 13: AVERAGE ANNUAL ABSORPTION OF DOWNTOWN OFFICE SPACE, 1970-1984
I- Average Annual Downtown Office Absorption I
11970-1979-1 1-198g-1984-1 1-1970-1984-1
Ail1NT4 38. 0 307,778 14793
BALT I-- 262.101 183,556 27,724
SM-NO 1, 2a?10,1 756,667 1,83.793
sL"?mL 84,101 142,222 102,18
j GO 1,87,10 2,673,111 2,131,034
CDCIMATI 259,908 608.889 368.2Z7
CLE Lm 275.20 534,667 355,724
CULW 2S 316,10 294,889 329,17
- 394, 4M0 2,322,222 992. 698
577,E0 1,936,000 998,759
355. 20m 120,0M 282,069
F, 7a, 4m0 668,667 256,269
1, 221, 60 2,692,667 1, 54,207
97,10 190, 22: 126.003
E-P~ CI 218,2 88 370,222 265,241
719,808 1, 592,00 998,483
298, 40 574, 889 384,207
338,102 192,444 292,897YIDEZPLIS 246,308 1, 35, 556 491,241
N GEZN 329,400 9 22O 513,379
NEA YURX 5,694, 600 5,058, 667 5,497,241
132,5M 381,333 209,724
PHILAELPHIA 631, 220 1,05.556 747,379
PM.ENIx 145,700 6,889 102,621
p 17 K-F.RG H 413,100 939, q6 576,483
PMRTLAND 224,708 :56,33 33.276
SAINT LCUIS 285,200 877,111 468,897
SAINT PAUL 75,390 265,556 134,345
SAN ANTONIO 86,9000 212,222 125,172
SAN DIES301 175.655
SAN FRANCISCO 1,244,500 627,1 1,763.241
SEqTILE 308,500 1, 295,778 614, 837
WASHINGTON DC 925,0 1,912,333 1,231,724
TOTAL 19,627, 80 32,257,333 23,299,034
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EXHIBIT 10A
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HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER
Option A
10-YEAR CASH FLOW PROJECTION
ACTIVITY
ASSUMPTIONS (1)
0
1987
Desol/
Constr
1
1988
Constr/
Move-in
2
1989
Stblzd
Yr
3
1990
4
1991
5
1992
Exhibit 10A
W/0 HEFA BOND FINANCING
6 7 8 9 10
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Construction Cost (per 6SF)
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF)
Office Rental Rate (per RSF)
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF)
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF)
Operating Expenses
Operating Expenses
(per 6SF Bldg)
(per 6SF 6arage)
$121.70 $127.79 $134.17 $140.88 $147.93 $155.32 $163.09 $171.24
$20.00
$25.00
$30.00
$150.00
$7.00
$4.00
$20.60
$25.75
$30.90
$157.50
$7.35
$4.20
$21.22
$26.52
$31.83
$165.38
$7.72
$4.41
Building Revenues (2)
Parking Revenues
GROSS REVENUES
Less: Vacancy @ 0Z (3)
NET REVENUES (GROSS OPER INCOME)
Less: Operating Expenses (Bldg)
Less: Operating Expenses (Garage)
$21.85
$27.32
$32.78
$173.64
$8.10
$4.63
631,990
4,167
636,157
0
$22.51
$28.14
$33.77
$182.33
$8.51
$4.86
1,263,979
8,752
1,272,731
0
636,157 1,272,731
(521,630) 1547,712)
0 0
$23.19
$28.98
$34.78
$191.44
$8.93
$5.11
1,263,979
9,189
1,273,168
0
1 273,168
1580,575)
0
$23.88
$29.85
$35.82
$201.01
$9.38
$5.36
1,263,979
9,649
1,273,628
0
1 273,628
1615,409)
0
$24.60
$30.75
$36.90
$211.07
$179.81 $188.80 $198.24 $208.15 $218.56
$25.34
$31.67
$38.00
$221.62
$26.10
$32.62
$39.14
$232.70
$26.88
$33.60
$40.32
$244.33
$27.68
$34.61
$41.53
$256.55
$28.52
$35.64
$42.77
$269.38
$9.85 $10.34 $10.86 $11.40 $11.97 $12.57$5.63 $5.91 $6.21 $6.52 $6.84 $7.18
1,263,979
10,131
1,274,110
0
1,263,979
10,638
1,274,617
0
1,263,979
11,1701,275,149
0
1,263,979
11,728
1,275,707
0
1,263,979 1,263,979
12,314 12,930
1,276,294 1,276,909
0 0
1 274,110 1,274,617 1,275,149 1,275,707 1,276,294 1,276,909
1652,334) (691,474) (732,962) (776,940) (823,556) (872,970)
0 0 0 0 0 0
(1) Escalating at 5Z a Year:
Construction Costs
Operating Expenses
Parking Rental Rates
Escalating at 3% a Year:
Building Rental Rates
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP
Office
Retail
Parking
57,836
0
0
4
(3) Assume Vacancy for
Option A is 0%.
NET OPERATINS INCOME (FREE & CLEAR)
Less: Bround Rent
Less: Construction Loan Int @ 14% (4)
Less: Permanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 yrs (5)
Market-Rate Loan @ 14%, 30 yrs (6)
Debt Coverage Ratio (DS/NOI ess GR)
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
Plus: Amortization of HEFA Bonds
Plus: Amortization of Loan
Less: Depreciation
and Capitalized Expenses
Taxable Income (Loss)
Tax Shelter Benefit @ 35%
25% Investment Tax Credit (66.9%)
Cash Equity Required
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW
(375,000)
114,527
(375,000) (410,000) (425,000)
(604,595) (483,676)
725,019 692,594 658,219 621,777 583,143 542,187 498,767 452,737 403,940
(425,000) (425,000) (486,200) (486,200) (486,200) (556,213) (556,213) (556,213) (636,307)
(0) (0)
(1,233 397) (1,233 397)
6.44 6.42
(375,000) (375,000) (1,014,595)
(0)
(1, 233 197)
3.38
(0)
(1,233 397)
6.36
(0)
(1,233 397)
6.34
(0)
(1,233 397)
6.30
(0)
(1,233 397)
.28
(0) (0)
(1,233 397) (1,233 397)
6.25 3.22
(794,149) (933,378) (965,803) (1,061,378) (1,097,820) (1,136,454) (1,247,423) (1,290,843) (1,336,873) (1,465,764)
0
24,208
(579,397) (579,397)
(375,000) (375,000) (1,014,595) (1,373,546)
131,250 131,250 355,108 480,741
(2,159,266)
(1,488,567)
520,999
1,805,686
(243,750) (243,750) (659,486) (2,472,674) 1,393,307
-------- ------------------------------------------
(1,517,603)---(1,609,314)---(1,641,353)---(1,674,965)--(1,780,211)---(1,817,104)---(1,855,695) (1,976,106)---
(1,517,603) (1,609,314) (1,641,353) (1,674,965) (1,780,211) (1,817,104) (1,855,695) (1,976,106)
531,161 563,260 574,473 586,238 623,074 635,986 649,493 691,637
(44,4)-49,18-(2,37-(5026) (6435)647--------------------------------------------
(434,642) (498,118) (523,347) (550,216) (624,350) (654,856) (687,380) (774,127)
0
69,055
(579,397)
0
27,597
(579,397)
0
31,461
(579,397)
0
35,865
(579,397)
0 0
40,886 46,610
(579,397) (579,397)
0
53,136
(579,397)
0
60,575
(579,397)
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$8,637,065
AOB:1-12 aos 50%
13-18 #os 801
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Amount:
$0
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:
$8,637,065
(7) Total 6SF: 64,372
Project Costs:
Hard 8,637,065
Soft 2,159,266
Lease-Up Def 0
TPC w/o Land 10,796,331
TPC w/Land 15,633,229
Equity Req: 2,159,266
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @ 10% (31997,617)
IRR -176.50Z
ROA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 4.64% 4.431 4.217 3.98% 3.737 3.47% 3.19% 2.907 2.587
ROE or 'Cash on Cash' (BTCF/Equity) -43.23% -44.73% -49.15Z -50.84Z -52.63 -57.777 -59.781 -61.917. -67.88%
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE
Hard Costs Less 25% ITC
Soft Costs Less 25% ITC
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
Dep. Life
18
10
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584 399,584
179,813 179,813 179,813 179,813 179,813 179,813 179,813 179,813
579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397
1996
399,584
179,813
1997
399,584
179,813
Deprec Not Deprec
Taken Taken
3,196,674 5,793,971
(0)
579,397 579,397 3,196,674
YEAR 0
1985
Bround
Lease
0
1986
Design/
Apprvls
NOTES
Average ROA
Average ROE
3.68%
-54. 217.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------- ------- -------
EXHIBIT 1OB
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HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER
Option B
10-YEAR CASH FLOW PROJECTION W/O HEFA BOND FINANCIN6
YEAR
ACTIVITY
ASSUMPTIONS (1)
0
1985
Ground
Lease
0
1986
Design/
Apprvls
Construction Cost (per 6SF)
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF)
Office Rental Rate (per RSF)
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF)
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF)
Operating Expenses
Operating Expenses
(per 6SF Bldg)
(per 6SF Garage)
$117.27 $123.13 $129.29 $135.75 $142.54 $149.67 $157.15 $165.01 $173.26 $181.92 $191.02 $200.57 $210.60
$30.00
$35.00$40.00
$150.00
$7.00
$4.00
$30.90
$36.05
$41.20
$157.50
$7.35
$4.20
$31.83
$37.13
$42.44
$165.38
$7.72
$4.41
$32.78$38.25
$43.71
$173.64
$8.10
$4.63
$33.77
$39.39
$45.02$182.33
$8.51
$4.86
$34.78
$40.57$46.37$191.44
$8.93
$5.11
$35.82
$41.79
$47.76$201.01
$9.38
$5.36
$36.90
$43.05
$49.19$211.07
$38.00
$44.34
$50.67
$221.62
$39.14
$45.67
$52.19
$232.70
$40.32
$47.04
$53.76
$244.33
$41.53
$48.45
$55.37
$256.55
$42.77
$49.90
$57.03
$269.38
$9.85 $10.34 $10.86 $11.40 $11.97 $12.57
$5.63 $5.91 $6.21 $6.52 $6.84 $7.18
Building Revenues (2)
Parking Revenues
GROSS REVENUES
Less: Vacancy @ 15% (3)
1,896,182
52,093
1,948,275(144,730)
3,792,364
109,396
3,901,759(289,460)
3,792,364
114,865
3,907,229
(289,460)
3,792,364
120,609
3,912,972(289,460)
3,792,364
126,639
3,919,003(289,460)
4,396,389
132,971
4 529,360
1335,564)
4,396,389
139,620
4 536,008
1335,564)
4,396,389
146,601
4 542,989
1335,564)
4,398,389
153,931
4 550,319
1335,564)
4,396,389
161,627
4 558,016
1335,564)
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP
Office
Retail
Parking
NET REVENUES (GROSS OPER
Less: Operating Expenses
Less: Operating Expenses
INCOME)
(Bldg)
(Garage)
NET OPERATING INCOME (FREE & CLEAR)
Less: Ground Rent
Less: Construction Loan Int @ 14% (4)
Less: Permanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 yrs (5)
Market-Rate Loan §14, 30 yrs (6)
Debt Coverage Ratio (DE/NOI less 6R)
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
(375,000) (375,000) (410,000)
(1,342,265)
(375,000) (375,000) (1,752,265)
1 803,545
1959,140)(83,386)
761,019(425,000)
(1,073,812)
3,612,299
(1,007,097)(87,555)
2 517,647
I425,000)
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.80
3,617,769
(1,057,452)(91,933)
3,623,512
(1,110,324)(96,530)
21 468,384 2 416,658I425,000) 1486,200)
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.78
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.75
3,629,543
(1,165,840)(101,356)
4,193,796
(1 224,132)
1106,424)
4,200,445
(1 285,339)
1111,745)
4,207,426
(1 349,606)
(117,333)
4,214,756
(1 417,086)
1123, 199)
4,222,452
(1 487,941)
129,359)
2 362,346 2,863,240 2,803,361 2,740,487 2,674,470 2 605,153
1486,200) (486,200) (556,213) (556,213) (556,213) 1636,307)
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.73
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.89
(737,793) (645,628) (694,890) (807,816) (862,129) (361,235)
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.85
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.83
(0)
(2,738 275)
&.81
(0)
(2,738 275)
6.77
(491,127) (554,000) (620,017) (769,429)
(3) Assume Vacancy for
Office & Retail in
Option B is 151.
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$19,175,218
AOB:1-12 mos 507
13-18 mos 80%
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Amount:
$0
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:
$19,175,218
Plus: Amortiz of HEFA Bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Plus: Amortization of Loan 53,744 61,269 69,846 79,625 90,772 103,480 117,968 134,483 153,311
Less: Depreciation (1,596,950) (1,596,950) (1,596,950) (1,59%,950) (1,596,950) (1,596,950) (1,596,950) (1,598,950) (1,596,950) (1,596,950)
and Capitalized Expenses
Taxable Income (Loss) (375,000) (375,000) (1,752,265) (2,334,743) (2,188,833) (2,230,571) (2,334,920) (2,379,453) (1,867,412) (1,984,597) (2,032,982) (2,082,484) (2,213,068)
Tax Shelter Benefit @ 357 131,250 131,250 613,293 817,160 766,092 780,700 817,222 832,809 653,594 694,609 711,544 728,869 774,574
25% Investment Tax Credit (4.6%) 253,452
Cash Equity Required (4,793,804)
---------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW (243,750) (243,750) (1,138,972) (4,714,438) 373,916 85,809 9,406 (29,320) 292;359 203,482 157,543 108,852 5,145
(7) Total 6SF: 136,371
Project Costs:
Hard 17,631,430
Soft 4,407,858
Lease-Up Def 1,929,734
TPC N/o Land 23,969,022
TPC w/Land 28,805,920
Equity Req: 4,793,804
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @ 10% (4,326,518)
IRR 
-26.13Z
ROA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 8.74% 8.572 8.39% 8.20% 9.94% 9.73% 9.51% 9.281 9.04'
ROE or 'Cash on Cash' (BTCF/Equity) -13.471 -14.50Z -16.85Z -17.98% -7.54. -10.251 -11.56Z -12.937 -16.05
-= --- -------------- - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - -
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE
Hard Costs Less 25% ITC
Soft Costs Less 25% ITC
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
968,259 968,259 968,259
628,690 628,690 628,690
1991 1992
968,259 968,259
628,690 628,690
1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950
1993
968,259
628,690
1994
968,259
628,690
1995
968,259
628,90
1,596,950 1,598,950 1,596,950 1,596,950
1996
968,259
628,690
1997
968,259
628,690
1,596,950 1,596,950
Average ROA
Average ROE
9.05%
-13.461
Deprec Not Deprec
Taken Taken
7,746,075(0)
7,746,075
15,969,495
0
1987
Demol/
Constr
1
1988
Constr/
Move-in
2
1989
Stblzd
Yr
3
1990
4
1991
5
1992
Exhibit 1OB
6
1993
Turning
Yr
7
1994
8
1995
9
1996
10
1997
NOTES
(1) Escalating at 5% a Year:
Construction Costs
Operating Expenses
Parking Rental Rates
Escalating at 3% a Year:
Building Rental Rates
56,819
48,900
1,362
50
Dep. Life
18
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HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER Exhibit 10C
Option C
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~- - ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
YEAR
ACTIVITY
ASSUMPTIONS (1)
Construction Cost (per 6SF)
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF)
Office Rental Rate (per RSF)
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF)
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF)
Operating Expenses
Operating Expenses
(per 6SF Bldg)
(per GSF Garage)
0
1985
Ground
Lease
10-YEAR CASH FLOW PROJECTION W/0 HEFA BOND FINANCIN6
0
1986
Design/
Apprvls
0
1987
Demol/
Constr
1
1988
Constr/
Move-in
2
1989
Stblzd
Yr
3
1990
4
1991
5
1992
6
1993
Turning
Yr
7
1994
8
1995
9
1996
10
1997
$89.26 $93.72 $98.41 $103.33 $108.50 $113.92 $119.62 $125.60 $131.88 $138.47 $145.40 $152.66 $160.30
$30.00
$35.00
$40.00
$150.00
$7.00
$4.00
$30.90
$36.05
$41.20
$157.50
$7.35
$4.20
$31.83
$37.13
$42.44$165.38
$7.72
$4.41
$32.78
$38.25
$43.71
$173.64
$8.10
$4.63
$33.77
$39.39
$45.02$182.33
$8.51
$4.86
$34.78
$40.57
$46.37
$191.44
$8.93
$5.11
$35.82
$41.79
$47.76
$201.01
$9.38
$5.36
$36.90
$43.05
$49.19
$211.07
$38.00
$44.34
$50.67
$221.62
$39.14
$45.67
$52.19$232.70
$40.32
$47.04
$53.76
$244.33
$41.53
$48.45
$55.37
$256.55
$42.77
$49.90
$57.03
$269.38
$9.85 $10.34 $10.86 $11.40 $11.97 $12.57$5.63 $5.91 $6.21 $6.52 $6.84 $7.18
NOTES
(1) Escalating at 5% a Year:
Construction Costs
Operating Expenses
Parking ental Rates
Escalating at 3% a Year:
Building Rental Rates
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building Revenues (2)
Parkinq Revenues
GROSS REVENUES
Less: Vacancy @ 15% (3)
3,969,989
106,270
4 076,259
1451,444)
7,939,978
223,167
8,163,145
(902,889)
7,939,978
234,325
8 174,304
1902,889)
7,939,978
246,042
8,186,020(902,889)
7,939,978
258,344
8,198,322(902,889)
9,204,611
271,261
9,475,872
(1,046,696)
9,204,611
284,824
9,489,435
(1,046,696)
9,204,611
299,065
9,503,676(1,046,696)
9,204,611
314,018
9,518,629
(1,046,696)
9,204,611
329,7199,534,330
(1,046,696)
NET REVENUES (GROSS OPER INCOME) 3,624,815 7,260,256 7,271,415 7,283,131 7,295,433 8,429,176 8,442,739 8,456,980 8,471,934 8,487,635Less: Operating Expenses (Bldg) (1,896,951) (1,991,799) (2 091,389) (2 195,958) (2 305,756) (2 421,044) (2 542,096) (2 669,201) (2 802,661) (2 942,794)
Less: Operating Expenses (Garage) (204,890) (215,135) 1225,892) 1237,186) 1249,046) 1261,498) 1274,573) 1288,301) 1302,716) 1317,852)
NET OPERATING INCOME (FREE & CLEAR) 1 522,973 5 053,323 4 954,134 4 849,986 4 740,631 5,746,634 5,626,070 5,499,478 5,366,556 5 226,988
Less: Ground Rent (375,000) (375,000) (410,000) 1425,000) 1425,000) 1425,000) 1486,200) 1486,200) (486,200) (556,213) (556,213) (556,213) I636,307)
Less: Construction Loan Int @ 14% (4) (2,254,476) (1,803,581)A
Less: Permanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 rs (5) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)Market-Rate Loan @14 1 30 yrs (6) (4,599 222) (4,599 222) (4,599 222) (4,599 222) (4,599,222) (4,599 222) (4,599,222) (4,599 222) (4,599 222)Debt Coverage Ratio (DS/NOI less BR) 1.01 6.99 6.95 0.93 1.13 1.09 1.07 1.04 1.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW (375,000) (375,000) (2,664,476) (705,608) 29,100 (70,088) (235,436) (344,791) 661,212 470,635 344,043 211,121 (8,541)
------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Plus: Amortiz of HEFA Bonds
Plus: Amortization of Loan
Less: Depreciation
and Capitalized Expenses
Taxable Income (Loss)
Tax Shelter Benefit @ 35%
25% Investment Tax Credit (4.6%)
Cash Equity Required
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW
0
90,269
(2,791,906) (2,791,906)
(375,000) (375,000) (2,664,476) (3,497,515)
131,250 131,250 932,567 1,224,130
(8,051,702)
(2,672,537)
935,388
256,794
(243,750) (243,750) (1,731,910) (7,533,180) 1,221,283
0
102,907
(2,791,906)
0 0
117,314 133,738
(2,791,906) (2,791,906)
0 0
152,461 173,805
(2,791,906) (2,791,906)
0
198,138
(2,791,906)
0
225,877
(2,791,906)
0
257,500
(2,791,906)
(2,759,087) (2,910,028) (3,002,959) (1,978,233) (2,147,466) (2,249,725) (2,354,908) (2,542,947)
965,681 1,018,510 1,051,036 692,382 751,613 787,404 824,218 890,032
---------------------------- 
---
895,593 783,074 706,245 1,353,594 1,222,248 1,131,447 1,035,339 -881,491
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP
Office
Retail
Parking
58,591
144,473
11,298
102
(3) Assume Vacancy for
Office & Retail in
Option C is 15%.
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$32,206,807
AOB:1-12 mos 50%
13-18 mos 80z
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Amount:
$0
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:
$32,206,807
(7) Total GSF: 278,342
Project Costs:
Hard 27,391,400
Soft 6,847,850
Lease-Up Def 6,019,259
TPC w/o Land 40,258,509
TPC w/Land 49,932,305
Equity Req: 8,051,702
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @ 10% (3,131,990)
IRR -1.02
ROA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 10.121 9.92% 9.71% 9.49% 11.51. 11.27% 11.017. 10.75% 10.47%
ROE or 'Cash on Cash' (BTCF/Equity) 0.361 -0.87% -2.927. -4.287. 8.217. 5.857 4.277 2.621 -0.117.
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE
Hard Costs Less 25% ITC
Soft Costs Less 25% ITC
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331
1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575
2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906
1991 1992 1993
1,510,331 1,510,331
1,281,575 1,281,575
2,791,906 2,791,906
1994 1995 1996 1997
1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 11510.331
1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281,575 1,281.575
2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906
Average ROA
Average ROE
10.471
1.46Z
Deprec Not Deprec
Taken Taken
12,082,651
0
12,082,651
27,919,064
Dep. Life
18
10
1985
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NET PRESENT VALUE OF ALLOWABLE TAX DEDUCTIONS Exhibit 11
Options A, B & C
SYNDICATION POTENTIAL
OPTION A - Tax Deductions
Annual Depreciation
Construction Loan Interest
HEFA Band Interest
Market-Rate Loan Interest
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
- --- 
579,397
604,595 483,676
1996 1997
579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397 579,397
690,965 684,866 678,278 671,164 663,480 655,182 646,220 636,541 626,0880 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Option A Deductions
NPV of eductions @ 6% Inflation
Potential Value as Tax Losses (35%)
Sale to Investors ($.85 on $1.00)
7 of Required Equity
OPTION B - Tax Deductions
Annual Depreciation
Construction Loan Interest
HEFA Bond Interest
Market-Rate Loan Interest
Total Deductions
NPV of Deductions @ 6% Inflation
Potential Value as Tax Losses (35%)
Sale to Investors ($.85 on $1.00)
Z of Required Equity
OPTION C - Tax Deductions
Annual Depreciation
Construction Loan Interest
HEFA Bond Interest
Market-Rate Loan Interest
Total Deductions
NPV of Deductions @ 6% Inflation
Potential Value as Tax Losses (35%)
Sale to Investors ($.85 on $1.00)
7 of Required Equity
9,589,360
3,356,276
2,852 835
131. 12%
27,488,571
9,621,000
8,177 850
176.59%
50,250,445
17,587,656
14,949,507
185.677
604,595 1,063,-073-1,270,362--,264,26 1,257,675 1,2 6 ,604,595 1,063,073 1,270,362 1,264,263 1,257,675 1,250,561 1,242,877 1,234,579 1,225,617 1,215,938 1,205,485
1,596,950
1,342,265 1,073,812
733,468
1,400,962
1,342,265 2,670,762 3,731,380
2,791,906
2,254,476 1,803,581
- 569,741
3,511,906
2,254,476 4,595,488 6,873,553
1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950 1,596,950
726,993
1,397,036
3,720,979
720,000
1,392,559
3,709,509
712,448
1,387,456
3,696,854
704,292
1,381,639
3,682,881
695,484
1,375,007
3,667,441
685,970
1,367,446
3,650,366
675,696
1,358,827
3,631,473
646,000
1,349,002
3,591,952
2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906 2,791,906
564,712
3,502,063
6,858,681
559,280
3,490,842
6,842,028
553,414
3,478,050
6,823,370
547,078
3,463,467
6,802,451
540,236
3,446,842
6,778,984
532,846
3,427,890
6,752,642
542,865
3,406,285
6,741,056
516,246
3,381,655
6,689,807
EXHIBIT 12
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HCHP BOSTON HEALTH CENTER Exhibit 13
Option C
10-YEAR CASH FLON PROJECTION W/A66RESSIVE ASSUMPTIONS
YEAR 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
ACTIVITY Bround Design/ Demol/ Constr/ Stblzd Turning
Lease ApprvIs Constr Move-in Yr Yr
Construction Cast (per 8SF)
HCHP Preferred Rental Rate (per RSF)
Office Rental Rate (per RSF)
Retail Rental Rate (per RSF)
Parking Rental Rate (per RSF)
Operating Expenses
Operating Expenses
(per 8SF Bldg)
(per 8SF Garage)
$89.26 $93.72 $98.41 $103.33 $108.50 $113.92 $119.62 $125.60 $131.88 $138.47 $145.40 $152.66 $160.30
$30.00
$35.00
$40.00$150.00
$7.00
$4.00
$31.50
$36.75
$42.00
$157.50
$7.35$4.20
$33.08
$38.59
$44.10
$165.38
$7.72$4.41
$34.73
$40.52
$46.31$173.64
$8.10
$4.63
$36.47
$42.54
$48.62
$182.33
$8.51$4.86
$38.29
$44.67
$51.05
$191.44
$8.93
$5.11
$40.20
$46.90
$53.60
$201.01
$9.38
$5.36
$42.21
$49.25
$56.28
$211.07
$9.85
$5.63
$44.32
$51.71
$59.10
$221.62
$46.54
$54.30
$62.05
$232.70
$48.87
$57.01
$65.16$244.33
$10.34 $10.86 $11.40
$5.91 $6.21 $6.52
$51.31
$59.86
$68.41
$256.55
$11.97
$6.84
$53.88
$62.85
$71.83
$269.38
$12.57
$7.18
(1) Escalating at 5% a Year:
Construction Costs
Operatin Expenses
Parking ental Rates
Building Rental Rates
Building Revenues (2)
Parkinq Revenues
GROSS REVENUES
Less: Vacancy @ 7-1/2% (3)
3,969,989
106,270
4 076,259
1239,128)
7,939,978
223,167
8,163,145
(478,256)
7,939,978
234,325
8 174,304
1478,256)
7,939,978
246,042
8 186,020
1478,256)
7,939,978
258,344
8,198,322(478,256)
9,204,611
271,261
9 475,872
1610,389)
9,204,611
284,824
9 489,435
1610,389)
9,204,611
299,065
9 503,676
I610,389)
9,204,611
314,018
9 518,629
1610,389)
9,204,611
329,719
9 534,330I610,389)
-------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Rentable SF:
HCHP
Office
Retail
Parking
NET REVENUES (BROSS OPER INCOME)
Less: Operating Expenses (Bldg)
Less: Operating Expenses (Barage)
3,837,131
(1 896,951)
1204,890)
7,684,889
(1,991,799)
(215,135)
7,696,048(2,091,389)
(225,892)
7,707,764(2 195,958)
1237,186)
7,720,066
(2 305,756)
1249,046)
8,865,482(2 421,044)
1261,498)
8,879,045
(2 542,096)
1274,573)
8,893,287(2 669,201)
1288,301)
8,908,240
(2 802,661)
1302,716)
8,923,941
(2 942,794)I317,852)
(3) Assume Vacancy for
Office & Retail in
Option C is 7-1/22.
NET OPERATING INCOME (FREE & CLEAR)
Less: Ground Rent
Less: Construction Loan Int 0 12% (4)
Less: Permanent Debt Service
HEFA Bonds @ 8%, 30 rs (5)
Market-Rate Loan @12%, 30 yrs (6)
Debt Coverage Ratio (DS/NOI ess BR)
BEFORE TAX CASH FLOW
(375,000) (375,000)
1 735,289
(410,000) 1425,000)
(1,796,526) (1,437,221)
5 477,955
1425,000)
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.41
(375,000) (375,000) (2,206,526) (126,931) 1,587,347
5 378,767
1425,000)
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.38
5 274,619
1486,200)
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.33
5 165,264 6,182,940 6,062,376 5 935,784 5,802,862 5 663,294
1486,200) (486,200) (556,213) 1556,213) (556,213) 1636;307)
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.31
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.56
1,488,159 1,322,811 1,213,456 2,231,133
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.51
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.48
(632,608)
(2,833 000)
1.44
(632,608)
(2,833 000)1.38
2,040,556 1,913,963 1,781,041 1,561,379
--------------------------------------------------------------------------.-----------------
Plus: Amaortiz of HEFA Bonds 62,867 67,896 73,328 79,194 85,530 92,372 99,762 107,743 116,362Plus: Amortization of Loan 94,569 105,907 118,616 132,850 148,792 166,647 186,644 209,042 234,127Less: Depreciation (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818) (2,508,818)
and Canitalize E y enses
Taxable Income (Loss)
Tax Shelter Benefit @ 35%
251 Investment Tax Credit (4.6%)
Cash Equity Required
AFTER TAX CASH FLOW
(375,000) (375,000) (2,206,526) (2,635,749)
131,250 131,250 772,284 922,512
(7,485,525)
(243,750) (243,750) (1,434,242) (6,689,944)
(764,034)
267,412
256,794
2,111,554
(846,856) (994,063) (1,083,318)
296,400 347,922 379,161
(43,363) (209,243) (308,449) (410,991) (596,949)
15,177 73,235 107,957 143,847 208,932
1,784,559 1,670,733 1,592,617 2,246,310 2,113,791 2,021,920 1,924,888 1,770,312
(4) Construction Loan Amount:
$29,942,099
AOB:1-12 mos 50%
13-18 mos 80%
(5) HEFA Bond Issue Amount:
$7,121,764
(6) Market-Rate Loan Amount:
$22,820,335
(7) Total 8SF: 278,342
Project Costs-
Hard 27,391,400
Soft 6,847,850
Lease-Up Def 3,188,374
TPC w/o Land 37,427,624
TPC w/Land 45,021,554
Equity Req: 7,485,525
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---
RETURN MEASURES
NPV of ATCF @ 10%11596370
IRR 15.247.
RDA (NOI/Total Project Cost) (7) 12.17% 10.77% 10.567 10.34% 12.38% 12.14% 11.89% 11.627. 11.347ROE or Cash on Cash (BTCF/Equity) 19.717 18.487 16.437 15.07% 27.717. 25.347 23.77. 22.12% 19.39%
-- -- -- -- -- -------------------------------------- 
-- -- ------ - - -- ---- -====  -- ----- -- ---
DEPRECIATION SCHEDULE
Hard Costs Less 25% ITC
Soft Costs Less 25% ITC
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
1986 1987 1988
1,510,331
998,487
1989
1,510,331
998,487
2,508,818 2,508,818
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331 1,510,331
998,487 998,487 998,487 998,487 998,487
2,508,818 2,508,819 2,508,818 2,508,818 2,508,818
1995 1996
1,510,331 1,510,331
998,487 998,487
1997
1,510,331
998, 487
Average RDA
Average ROE
11.472
20.897
Deprec Not Deprec
Taken Taken
12,082,651 25,088,179
(0)
2,508,818 2,508,818 2,508,818 12,082,651
NOTES
58,591
144,473
11,298
102
Dep. Life
18
10
1985
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ ------ ------ ------ASSUMPTIONS (1)
